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NOTES
CAN You BLOW MY WHISTLE? A HARMONIOUS MARRIAGE OF STATE
LEGISLATION AND FEDERAL PROTECTIONS TO CREATE A MORE
PERFECT UNION OF PRIVATE WHISTLEBLOWER RIGHTS
I. INTRODUCTION

A. A Tale of Corruption
Edward Snowden, Mark Felt, Sherron Watkins, and Daniel
Ellsberg.' Some of these names may look more familiar than others, but
the fact remains that they all share one common, distinct characteristic;
2
they are all whistleblowers. Whether the arena is government, politics,
or business, these people have played an integral role in helping spread
information and ultimately protect the public by exposing corrupt or
unethical behavior. 3 The difference between these names and the names
of people who blow the whistle on their employer, however, is that many

POST (July 31,
1. See Josh Hicks, 5 of the Most Famous Federal Whistleblowers, WASH.
20
14/07/31/5-famoushttps://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federal-eye/wp/
2014),
whistleblowers-from-the-federal-government/ (listing five of the most famous federal
whistleblowers and describing their actions); see also Associated Press, Enron Whistleblower Tells
PM),
7:46
2006,
15,
(Mar.
NEWS
NBC
Company',
'Crooked
of
1839694/ns/business-corporatescandals/t/enron-whistleblower-tellshttp://www.nbcnews.com/id/l
crooked-company/#.VrQUe7IrLIU (focusing on Sherron Watkins involvement in Enron
whistleblowing).
2. Mark Felt, more commonly known as "Deep Throat," was a former FBI official who
provided information in connection with President Nixon's involvement in Watergate, resulting in
Nixon's resignation from office. Hicks, supra note 1. Daniel Ellsberg was credited as the military
analyst who leaked the "Pentagon Papers," which revealed the extent of the Johnson
administration's deception to the public regarding U.S. military and political involvement in
Vietnam before the war. Id. More recently, whistleblower Edward Snowden leaked government
documents to the public which showed how and the extent to which the U.S. government collects
information on private citizens. Id.; see also Associated Press, supra note 1 (detailing Sherron
Watkins' involvement as a whistleblower in one of the largest financial controversies in American
history. Ms. Watkins was credited as the whistleblower that exposed the fraudulent accounting and
finance practices of Enron, eventually leading to their collapse in 2001).
3. See Hicks, supranote 1; see also Associated Press, supranote 1.
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of the people listed above become household names and end up on the
news and in history books, while the names of workplace whistleblowers
remain largely unknown.4 So why then, should the government make
every effort to protect these people's rights?
The federal government has had a compelling interest in enacting
meaningful legislation to streamline the whistleblowing process in order
to protect employee's rights.s Therefore, whistleblowers working in the
public sector of the United States, either for the federal government or in
some other public capacity, are provided seemingly unyielding
protections by the government. 6 Employees exposing corruption and
illegal acts, especially in industries that have a great impact on public
health and welfare, are free to express their concerns about fraudulent or
unethical practices under the shield of the federal statute. As a result of
these protections, employees in the public sector have thus had many
successful whistle-blows with little to no repercussions implemented on
said whistleblowers. This comes in contrast with the hand that many
4. "[F]or every whistleblower who finds himself plunged into the limelight, a dozen more
pass unnoticed. ... [B]eyond WikiLeaks whistleblower Chelsea Manning and Snowden, most
Americans would be hard-pressed to think of another whistleblower from the last decade." Rob
Price, Ronald Ridenhour, Phil Zimmerman, and 5 Other Whistleblowers You Should Know, DAILY
DOT (June 11, 2014), http://www.dailydot.com/politics/ronald-ridenhour-phil-zimmermanwhistleblowers-edward-snowden-unknown/.
5. See 29 U.S.C. § 218(c) (2012) (stating that an employer cannot discharge or discriminate
against an employee who has engaged in common acts of whistleblowing such as: providing
information regarding violations, testifying, and participating in a proceeding); see also Jason
Zuckerman,

Congress Strengthens Whistleblower Protections for Federal Employees, A.B.A.

(Nov./Dec.
2012),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/groups/laborlaw/ll_flash/1212_abalel-flash/lel-fla
shl2_20l2spec.html (explaining that whistleblowers play a crucial role in exposing various threats
to public health and safety); see also Federal Whistleblower Protections,NAT'L WHISTLEBLOWERS
CTR.,

http://www.whistleblowers.org/index.php?option-com_content&amp;task-ew&amp;id=816&am
p;Itemid=129 (last visited Dec. 22, 2016) (listing protections available to whistleblowers under
federal law).
6. See Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2007, H.R. 985, 110th Cong. §
10(e)(l)-(2) (2007) (enacted) (explaining that nothing in this section may be construed to authorize
the discharge, demotion, or discrimination of whistleblowers and that their rights may not be
preempted, modified, or derogated); see also NAT'L WHISTLEBLOWERS CTR., supra note 5 (listing
protections available to whistleblowers under federal law).
7. See Zuckerman, supra note 5 (explaining how the Whistleblower's Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012 strengthened whistleblower protection, which was crucial for those acting
to expose threats to public health); see also Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act (WPEA),
Gov'T

ACCOUNTABILITY

PROJECT, https://www.whistleblower.org/whistleblower-protection-

enhancement-act-wpea (last visited Dec. 27, 2016) (explaining how the WPEA provided protection
for those revealing government corruption).
8. See, e.g., California ex rel. Sherwin v. Office Depot, Inc., No. BC410135, 2015 Cal.
Super. LEXIS 32, at *2 (Cal. Feb. 11, 2015) (showing the success of David Sherwin's whistle-
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whistleblowers in the private sector have been dealt when dealing with a
situation where they should blow the whistle, but may fail to do so
9
because of inadequate or nonexistent protections.
The public sector was not always so forthcoming when it came to
0
protecting the rights of whistleblowers.1 However, that all changed
when Harriette Walters, an employee at the Office of Tax and Revenue
in Washington D.C., committed fraud." Ms. Walters stole over $48
million from the District, which went seemingly unnoticed for eighteen
years.12 Upon investigation, the D.C. Council concluded that Ms.
Walters was able to orchestrate such a large-scale theft "undetected"
because there was a lack of protections enacted for whistleblowers.13
Many employees felt insecure because there was nothing that provided
them with adequate protections, neither internally nor externally, and
they were unsure of what the outcome would be if they spoke out against
this fraudulent behavior.1 4 As a result, none of the other employees felt
comfortable reporting the theft, even though they were very much aware
that it was being committed." As a matter of fact, during the eighteen
years that this fraud was being committed, not one employee felt safe
enough to report this crime.' 6 When asked why no one reported the
misconduct, all that an assistant to the senior Office of the Chief
Financial Officer had to say was "snitches get stitches," expressing the
17
sentiment for whistleblowers at this time. Taking this apparent fear of
reporting, and coupling it with the widespread fraud that was known by
others and perpetuated by Ms. Walters for so long, was the primary
impetus for the D.C. legislature to amend its Whistleblower Protection
Act in order to achieve a more focused goal of protecting employees in
8
the private sector.
blow).
9. Ben Depoorter & Jef De Mot, Whistle Blowing: An Economic Analysis of the False
Claims Act, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REv. 135, 159 (2006).
10.

See US: Statement on Protection of Whistleblowers in Security Sector, HUM. RTS. WATCH

(June 18, 2013), https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/06/18/us-statement-protection-whistleblowerssecurity-sector (explaining that protection for government employees is a new practice).
11. R. Scott Oswald & Jason Zuckerman, D.C.'s Amended Whistleblower ProtectionAct: The
Gold Standard for Public Sector Whistleblower Protection, BNA 2 (Sept. 30, 2011),
https://www.zuckermanlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/DCs-Amended-WhistleblowerProtection-Act.pdf.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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The Whistleblower Protection Act (hereinafter "WPA") has a long
legislative history that significantly grew more and more protective of
federal employee's rights over the years.19 It all began in 1978, when
whistleblower rights were initially addressed in the Civil Service Reform
Act (hereinafter "CSRA"). 2 0 The CSRA set out rules and regulations for
federal civilian employees.2 1 More importantly, this act gave employees
their first ever protections against retaliation from their employers in the
event an incompetent employee was reported.22 This newfound ability
to report other employees for improperly performing their duties without
fear of retaliation was seemingly the first attempt at establishing
whistleblower protections for employees.23 Although ambitious in
nature, the whistleblower protection regulation found in the CSRA was
not enough, as employees were still being terminated for disclosing
inter-business violations.24 For example, in Fiorillo, a correctional
officer was suspended and subsequently demoted from his job because
he made allegations regarding the improper conduct of the supervisory
board at his place of work.25 Mr. Fiorillo assumed that his statements
would be protected under the CSRA, as they were true and required an
intervention of justice.26 However, the United States Court of Appeals
determined that because Fiorillo's primary motivation for the disclosure
was not for "the public good" and instead for his own personal reasons,
he was not protected by the CSRA.27 The Fiorillo case established that
employee motives would be taken into consideration when determining
if the protections outlined in the CRSA would be implemented or not.28
The enactment of the WPA recognized that Fiorillo was not the only
case producing unfavorable outcomes to employees, and therefore was
created to remedy this. 2 9

In 1989, the WPA was enacted by Congress to protect federal
employees from retaliation if they blew the whistle on activities that
19. See Whistleblower Protection History, OIG, http://oig.ssa.gov/whistleblowerprotection/history (last visited Dec. 28, 2016).
20. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1114 (Oct. 13, 1978).
21. Id. § 3.
22. Id. § 2301(6)-(9).
23. U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, REP. ON WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS FOR
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES 1 (2010).

24. Id. at 6; see also Fiorillo v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, 795 F.2d 1544, 1546
(Fed. Cir. 1986).
25. Fiorillo,795 F.2d at 1545.
26. Id.-at 1561.
27. Id. at 1550.
28. Id.
29. See id.; see also Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, 5 U.S.C. § 1201(b) (1989).
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would constitute malfeasance within the government. Congress stated
further that the CSRA was to be expanded to:
strengthen and improve protection for the rights of
Federal employees, to prevent reprisals, and to help
eliminate wrongdoing within the Government by-(1)
mandating that employees should not suffer adverse
consequences as a result of prohibited personnel
practices; and (2) establishing . .. that while disciplining

those who commit prohibited personnel practices may
be used as a means by which to help accomplish that
goal, the protection of individuals who are the subject of
prohibited personnel practices remains the paramount
consideration.30
Clearly, it was the goal of Congress to allow federal employees to
feel as though they could freely voice their concerns in a safe and
protected environment.3 1 However, there were limits as to who exactly
was permitted to assert these rights.32 An employee first had to be
considered a "covered employee" under the statute.33 To be considered
a "covered employee" meant that a person had to either be a current or
former employee or an applicant for employment in the government's
executive branch.34 Next, the covered employee had to ensure that their
disclosure fell under the "protected disclosures" prescribed by the
statute.35 This provision was purposely drafted to be very broad, and
thus protected "any disclosure," unlike the provision in CSRA, which
allowed deference to the Court in deciding if a disclosure was protected
or not.36 In fact, the Fiorillo decision was the reason why disclosures
were no longer limited to those motivated by a public concern, and the
reason why the court was therefore no longer allowed to prevent certain
disclosures that may indicate a government's wrongdoing.3 7 This was
duly noted in the Senate Report that supplemented the newly drafted

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
1986).

5 U.S.C. § 1201(b).
See OIG, supra note 19.
See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).
Id. § 2302(2)(A).
Id.
Id. § 2302(2)(D).
Compare id., with Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1114.
See Fiorillo v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, 795 F.2d 1544, 1561 (Fed. Cir.
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WPA. 38 The report stated in part, "[r]egardless of the official's motives,
personnel actions against employees should quite simply not be based on
protected activities such as whistleblowing." 39 The only exception to
this intentionally broad rule was that any disclosure expressly prohibited
by law or protected by an Executive Order was stringently not protected
by the WPA. 40 This meant that although whistleblower protections were
greatly expanded, there were still some barriers that could be the cause
of some uncertainty or hesitation for employees looking to report.41
Another potential reporting concern presented in the WPA that
employees had to take into consideration when reporting came in the
form of the particular disclosures that were required be made in order to
access the protections in the act.42 The WPA mandated that employee
disclosures must be made with a reasonable belief that the wrongdoing
was true, and must be made on the basis of gross mismanagement, gross
waste of funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to
public health or safety.43
Almost two decades after the WPA was enacted, and shortly after
the Harriet Walters' crime was eventually exposed, more protections
continued to surface for employees blowing the whistle in the public
sector." The Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2007
(hereinafter "WPEA") was created to amend the prior WPA and afford
more rights to federal employees, such as those who specialize in
national security issues like the Central Intelligence Agency.4 5
Disclosures were also expanded in the WPEA, making it mandatory that
any disclosure, regardless of time, place, or certainty, would be
protected.46 Washington D.C. amended its Whistleblower Protection
Act to allocate more protections to employees who have information that
may uncover corruption, fraud, or illegal acts within the workplace.47
38. See S. REP. No. 100-413, at 16 (1988).
39. Id.
40. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A).
41. See id. (explaining that there are limitations to disclosures, specifically, any disclosure not
explicitly prohibited by law or protected by an Executive Order is not afforded protection).
42. See id (explaining certain initial requirements that are needed before being able to receive
protection under the act, including having a reasonable belief that there has been violations of a law
or regulation).

43. Id.
44. See, e.g., Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2007, H.R. 985, 110th Cong. (1st
Sess. 2007).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See Whistleblower Protection Amendment Act of 2009, Vol. 57 D.C. Reg. 897-900 (Jan.
22, 2010); Oswald & Zuckerman, supra note 11, at 1.
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The recent amendments to the D.C. WPA protect a disclosure "without
restriction to time, place, form, motive, context, forum, or prior
A
disclosure made to any person by an employee or applicant.. .
employee's communication therefore does not have to be an original
disclosure to qualify for protection under the D.C. WPA, an element that
was not originally included before the amendment. 49 Today, this act is
considered to be the strongest public sector protection statute in the
country.50 Many other states and local governments have used the D.C.
WPA as a template when drafting more stringent protections for their
employees in the public sector.
It is clear that federal and state governments have made the move
toward taking adequate steps to protect public sector employees,5 2
however, private sector employees in the United States still fear
consequences in situations where they should rightfully blow the
whistle.53 This is mainly due to the lack of protections afforded to
them.54 Private sector employees, especially those in the financial,
health care, and pharmaceutical industries, for the most part lack
adequate statutory protections that will enable them complete freedom
and confidence to whistle-blow without the fear of possible
repercussions. 5 They may be subject to retaliation in the form of
dismissal, harassment, intimidation, or in some instances even
violence.5 6 The health and pharmaceutical industries are fields where
employee protections should be at their most prevalent, due to the
implications these industries have on the health and wellbeing of the
general populous, yet that does not seem to be the case. 57 The risk of
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

D.C. CODE § 1-615.52(a)(6) (2016).
See id.
Oswald & Zuckerman, supra note 11, at 1.
See id.
See, e.g., Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2007, H.R. 985, 110th Cong. (1st

Sess. 2007); see also CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40785,
CLAIMS ACT AND RELATED FEDERAL STATUES 16 (2009).

QuI

TAM: THE FALSE

53. Press Release, Keith Wrightson, Pub. Citizen, Whistleblower Laws for Private Sector
29,
2014),
(Apr.
Need of Reform
in
Dire
Inadequate,
Grossly
Workers
http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/pressroomredirect.cfn?ID-4153.

54. Id.
55.

Private Sector Whistleblowers: Are There Sufficient Legal Protections? Hearing Before

the Subcomm. on Workforce Prot., Comm. on Educ. & Lab., 110th Cong. 35-39 (2007) (statement
of Robert E. Moberly, Cline Williams Research Chair, University of Nebraska College of Law).
56. See David Banisar, Whistleblowing: InternationalStandards and Developments 7 (Feb. 1,
2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with World Bank-Institute for Social Research, UNAM,
[hereinafter
Washington, D.C.), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=1753180
Banisar].
57. See infra Part I.
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corruption is significantly heightened in environments such as these
where the reporting of wrongdoing is not supported or protected either
by employers or by shelter of the law.ss The effects of fraud going
undetected in such large and influential corporate structures are
damaging not only to the government's economy, but, more importantly,
to the general welfare of the public as a whole. 9
B. Why Whistleblow?
A whistleblower is an employee who reports employer wrongdoing
to a governmental or law-enforcement agency. 60 They play an important
role in promoting positive organizational change by exposing crucial
issues that may adversely affect the public if left unchecked. 6 1 They
play a role so important, in fact, that Congress elected by unanimous
vote to have an entire day honoring whistleblowers.62 Moreover, in the
past four decades, whistleblowers have been credited with protecting the
public welfare by exposing fraud and corruption in areas ranging from
politics, to business, and even sports and entertainment.63 The means by
which whistleblowers go about achieving this goal is by spotting
potential issues or trouble areas within an organization and bringing
these problems to the light by reporting them either to the appropriate
governmental agency, the media, or internally-if an organization has an
internal whistleblower protocol. 4 However, when the protection for
these people should be at its most powerful, it is at its most vulnerable.65
The lack of protections and incentives for whistleblowers in the
private sector, especially in industries that have the potential to greatly
affect the public, have been a cause of concern for many employees
58. Whistleblower Protection: Encouraging Reporting,
http://www.oecd.org/cleangovbiz/toolkit/50042935.pdf.
59. See infra Part I.B.
60.

OECD

3

(July

2012),

Whistleblower, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).

61. See Janet P. Near & Marcia P. Miceli, Effective Whistle-Blowing, 20 THE ACAD. OF
MGMT. REv. 679, 681 (1995).
62. "By a unanimous resolution the U.S. Senate declared July 30, 2013 as 'National
Whistleblower Appreciation Day."' Senate Establishes "National Whistleblower Appreciation
Day, "
WHISTLEBLOWERS
CTR.,
http://www.whistleblowers.org/index.php?option=comcontent&task-view&id=1445&temid=71
(last visited Sept. 20, 2016).
63. Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Four Signal Moments in Whistleblower Law: 1983-2013, 30
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 389, 389 (2013) (citing whistleblowers as the impetus to bringing down
a United States President, exposing fraud in the tobacco and financial industries, and destroying
beloved cyclist Lance Armstrong).
64. Id. at 390.
65. See infra notes 92-105 and accompanying text.
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looking to expose corrupt and potential harmful practices of
employers.6 6 In 1972, Thomas A. Robertson, a Director of Development
at Firestone, sent a memo warning top management at the company of a
safety issue with one of its tire models. 6 7 His report was ignored and the

tire was kept on the market. 6 8 The result was hundreds of serious
injuries and more than three dozen deaths stemming from the defective
tires; most, if not all, of which could have been avoided if Firestone had
an internal whistleblower policy, or if Robertson had an appropriate
outlet to blow the whistle externally.69
More recently, in 2010, reports have revealed that not much ground
has been made in terms of arming private sector employees with the
tools necessary to protect the public against the harmful actions of
corporate giants.70 Cheryl Eckard, a quality control employee of
pharmaceutical giant GlaxoSmithKline (hereinafter "GSK"), was
assigned to monitor and report on production at GSK's manufacturing
plant in Puerto Rico." What she discovered during her investigation
was contaminated production equipment, water tainted with bacteria,
and, worst of all, over-the-counter drugs being mixed in with
prescription medications.7 2 Ms. Eckard voiced her concerns to upper
management, who assured her that a report had been submitted to the
Food and Drug Administration (hereinafter "FDA"), and that GSK had
been cleared of any violations. After eight months of continued

66.

See, e.g., Karen Higginbottom, Employees Still Fear Blowing The Whistle On Their

Firms, FORBES

(Oct. 8, 2015, 5:06 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/karenhigginbottom/2015/10/08/employeesstill-fear-blowing-the-whistle-on-their-firms/; Tim Higgins & Nick Summers, GM Recalls: How
GeneralMotors Silenced a Whistle-Blower, BLOOMBERG BUS[NESSWEEK (June 19, 2014, 9:49 PM),

http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-06-18/gm-recalls-whistle-blower-was-ignored-marybarra-faces-congress.
67. Lilanthi Ravishankar, Encouraging Internal Whistleblowing in Organizations, SANTA

CLARA U. (Feb. 4, 2003), http://www.scu.edu/ethics/publications/submitted/whistleblowing.html.
68. Id.
69. Id.; see also Higgins & Summers, supra note 66 (detailing the failures of the auto industry
to remedy their continued corporate culture of complacency more than forty years after the

Firestone Tire incident). Steven Oakley, a safety inspector at General Motors, recounts the feeling
of being "too afraid to insist on safety concerns with the Cobalt after seeing his predecessor 'pushed
out of the job for doing just that."' Id. This corporate culture of fear and complacency at GM was
cited as one of the main reasons why ignition issues with the Cobalt failed to surface resulting in
thirteen deaths and fifty-four crashes. Id.
70. See Scott Pelley, Glaxo Whistle-Blower Lawsuit: Bad Medicine, CBS NEWS (Dec. 29,
2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/glaxo-whistle-blower-lawsuit-bad-medicine/.
7 1. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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reporting,74 Ms. Eckard was rewarded for her efforts by being
downsized out of the company. 7 Luckily, the malfeasance of GSK was
eventually discovered and an action was brought against them under the
False Claims Act, but not before adulterated and defective
pharmaceutical drugs made it past the production procesS 76 and were
released to the public, subsequently causing harm to those who bought
the drugs.77
Meanwhile, in the public sector, Congress has enacted a wide range
of laws that both protect and incentivize employees looking to expose
any wrongdoings of their employer.
The False Claims Act (hereinafter
"FCA"),79 the CSRA,80 the Whistleblower Protection Act (hereinafter
"WPA"),8 1 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (hereinafter "SOX") 82 are some
examples of widely known acts of Congress that have expanded the
rights of whistleblowers in the public sector 8 3 -or whistleblowers of
private companies doing work in the public sector 8 4-while
also
outlining the consequences that an employer may face if retaliation
occurs.85 The variety of laws in this area have been hugely effective in
encouraging employees to blow the whistle and expose corrupt or illegal
practices in the public sector.8 6 In the past five years, the federal
74. In her interview with 60 Minutes, Ms. Eckard recalls an incident with the Vice President
of Manufacturing during this period where she was asked to stop coming into work upset over the
condition of the Puerto Rico plant:
The director of manufacturing at the factory, maybe he was the [Vice
President] of manufacturing at the factory, he pulled me aside and said, "We
can all tell that you've been crying. You come here every day and your eyes
are swollen because you've been crying. So I want to ask you to stop that."
And I said to him, "You know, I do cry. I cry at night. I cry in the morning.
And what I don't understand is why I'm the only one. Why aren't you
crying?"
Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See JON 0. SHIMABUKURO & L. PAIGE WHITAKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42727,
WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS UNDER FEDERAL LAW: AN OVERVIEW 1 (2012) [hereinafter,
SHIMABUKURO & WHITAKER, AN OVERVIEW].
79. See DOYLE, supra note 52.

80. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. §§ 3(l)-(3), 1205(a)(l)-(2), 2301(a), (b)(9)
(1978).
81. Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, 5 U.S.C. § 1201 (2012).

(Jan.

82.

SHIMABUKURO & WHITAKER, AN OVERVIEW, supra note 78, at 12.

83.
84.
85.
86.

Id at 1.
Id.
Id. at 12.
See, e.g., Reuben Guttman, Claiming Credit for False Claims Act in 2014?, THE HILL

7,

2015,

12:00

PM),

http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/the-administration/228651-
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government has recovered over $24 billion for successful claims under
the FCA alone. 87 This is partially due to the built-in incentive system of
the FCA that works as additional motivation for employees
The same results
contemplating whether or not to blow the whistle.
cannot be shown, however, for employees in the private sector where
whistleblower cases are at an all-time high and rising. 89
Although progress relating to employee rights and protections when
blowing the whistle has been made," finding a permanent and effective
resolution to this growing issue for whistleblowers in the private sector
has continued to remain a major point of contention. 91 Existing
protections for these types of employees generally consist of company
policies and bylaws, supplemented by a patchwork of federal and state
laws. 92 In terms of state coverage for whistleblowers, there is almost no
claiming-credit-for-false-claims-act-success-in-2014.
87. Press Release, The U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, Justice Department
Recovers Over $3.5 Billion From False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2015, (Dec. 3, 2015),
https://www justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-35-billion-false-claims-act-cases-

fiscal-year-2015; Press Release, The U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, Justice
Department Recovers Nearly $6 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2014, (Nov.

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-nearly-6-billion-false2014),
20,
claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2014; Press Release, The U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Public
Affairs, Justice Department Recovers $3.8 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year
2013, (Dec. 13, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-38-billion-falseclaims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2013; Press Release, The U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Public
Affairs, Justice Department Recovers Nearly $5 Billion in False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year

2012, (Dec. 14, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-nearly-5-billionfalse-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2012; Press Release, The U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Public
Affairs, Justice Department Recovers $3 Billion in False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2011,

(Dec. 19, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-3-billion-false-claimsact-cases-fiscal-year-2011; Press Release, The U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs,
Department of Justice Recovers $3 Billion in False Claims Cases in Fiscal Year 2010, (Nov. 22,
https://www.justice.gov/opalpr/department-justice-recovers-3-billion-false-claims-cases2010),
fiscal-year-2010.
88. See Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Do Good and Get Rich:
Financial Incentives for Whistleblowing and the False Claims Act, 37 VILL. L. REV. 273, 273
(1992).
89. See, e.g., Debra Friedman, Is OSHA About To Ramp Up Its Whistleblower Program?,
LAW360 (Jan. 23, 2015, 1:11 PM),
http://www.1aw360.com/articles/613161/is-osha-about-to-ramp-up-its-whistleblower-program.
90.
91.

SHIMABUKURO & WHITAKER, AN OVERVIEW, supra note 78.
See, e.g., Scott Gerber, The Whistleblower Protection Program Is Broken Too,

HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 19, 2014, 5:59
gerber/whistleblower-protection_b_5510792.html.

AM),

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/scott-d-

92. See Patricia Patrick, Be PreparedBefore You Blow the Whistle: Protection Under State
http://www.fraud2010),
(Sept./Oct.
MAGAZINE
FRAUD
Laws,
Whistle-Blowing

magazine.com/article.aspxid=4294968656 (describing various state and federal laws that
whistleblowers implemented and the relevance of consulting internally with the company before
consulting externally).
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uniformity amongst the states in either the statutory or common law
scheme of protections. 93 Although the federal government has enacted a
variety of acts which have addressed whistleblowing against private
sector employers, 94 none have come close to providing these employees
with the protections or incentives they need to feel confident enough to
actually blow the whistle.
C. Summary
This Note will discuss the issues relating to the rights of employees
in the private sector who attempt to expose corrupt or illegal practices of
their employer by whistleblowing, especially in major consumer
industries, such as the financial, healthcare, and pharmaceutical
industries. 95 It will address the issues relating to employee's rights when
whistleblowing in the these types of industries and why greater
protections are necessary,96 the successes and failures of individual state
efforts to protect whistleblowers in the private industry, 97 and the extent
of federal efforts by the government to address and extend protections to
the private sector. 98 This Note will also explore the merits of proposed
federal legislation aimed at protecting the rights of private
whistleblowers by mirroring the protections and incentives set up in the
False Claims Act (hereinafter "FCA") in combination with the
foundational barriers created by individual state legislation to create
more streamlined, uniform protections for whistleblowers. 99

93.

See

Know

Your

Rights

FAQ,

NAT'L

WHISTLEBLOWER

CTR.,

http://www.whistleblowers.org/resources/faq-page/know-your-rights-faq (last visited Dec. 20, 2016)
(describing the differences between the various state whistleblowing laws); State Whistleblower
Laws, NAT'L CONF. OF ST. LEGIS., http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/state-

whistleblower-laws.aspx (last visited Dec. 20, 2016) (listing various state whistleblower laws).
94. Congress has enacted twenty-two statutes that contain whistleblower provisions relating
to private sector employees. Friedman, supra note 89; see also The Whistleblower Protections
Program: Statutes, U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., http://www.whistleblowers.gov/statutes-page.html (last

visited Dec. 26, 2016) (lists all twenty-two federal whistleblower statutes); OSHA Fact Sheet: Your
Rights
as
a
Whistleblower,
OSHA,
https://www.osha.gov/OshDoc/data GeneralFacts/whistleblower-rights.pdf (last visited Dec. 22,
2016) (lists all twenty-two federal whistleblower statutes).
95.
96.

See generally infra Section H.
See generally infra Section II.

97. See generally infra Section III.
98.
99.

See generally infra Section IV.
See generally infra Section V.
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II. ISSUES RELATING TO WHISTLEBLOWING IN THE HEALTHCARE
AND PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES

A. Cases and Controversies
Whistleblower protections for employees in the healthcare and
pharmaceutical industries are especially important because of the direct
effect these industries have on the health and welfare of the public.'0o
For example, the pharmaceutical industry supplied about $329 billion
worth of drugs to consumers in the United States in 2013.101 This is an
industry where, even under the supervision of the FDA, as many as fifty
percent of drugs produced each year can end up being defective.102
Moreover, this is an industry where the failure to properly regulate these
defective drugs can be the cause of more than 40,000 deaths per year.103
There are, however, solutions to reducing these staggering numbers,
such as increasing protections for employees who bear witness to the
instrumentalities that allow pharmaceutical companies to produce and
04
distribute defective drugs.'
Providing whistleblowers with added protections may help them
bring to light issues that an organization may be turning a blind eye tosomething that can be extremely detrimental when it comes to protecting
the good of the public.10 5 As such, it is imperative that employees of
companies in these industries have access to unfettered statutory
protections so that they can feel confident in alerting the public of
corporate misconduct.106 Laws addressing whistleblowers in these areas
have been proven to be effective in protecting employees of the public
sector,1 07 but there has also been some applicability of these laws,
although limited, in the private sector when dealing with cases
concerning health and safety.108
100. See generally Ravishankar, supra note 67 (describing various examples of how the public
welfare was directly harmed because of the healthcare and pharmaceutical industries).
101. See Nicole Davies, FDA Focus: Recalling Dangerous and Defective Drugs, PHARMA
LETTER (Aug. 1, 2015), http://www.thepharmaletter.com/article/fda-focus-recalling-dangerous-anddefective-drugs.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See Ravishankar, supra note 67.
105. Id.

106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See ANNE LAWRENCE & JAMES WEBER, BUSINESS AND SOCIETY: STAKEHOLDER, ETHICS,
AND PUBLIC POLICY (11th ed. 2007).
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One of the most prevailing examples of a successful private sector
whistle-blow relating to health and safety was evident in the Franklin
case.10 9 In 2001, David Franklin, a former Parke-Davis employee,
exposed the illegal marketing of an epilepsy drug, Neurontin. 110 He was
an internal employee for this pharmaceutical company, who had
knowledge that his employers were marketing Neurontin for illnesses
such as headaches, bipolar disorder, and other neurological disorders."'
The issue in this case was that Neurontin was being fraudulently
advertised to the public as an effective solution for various psychiatric
illnesses, when in reality there was evidence that showed the contrary.1 12
In fact, the drug was not at all effective for any of the aforementioned
illnesses.11 3 After the Parke-Davis CEO was found guilty of committing
criminal and civil violations under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act,
he was ordered to pay fines totaling $430 million.11 4 Not only were the
penalties a substantial victory for the Plaintiffs, but the publicity that
stemmed from this case brought to light the very real possibility of
rampant fraud that can continue to grow in the pharmaceutical industry
if left unchecked."' It was stated that Franklin represented one of
the largest False Claims Act recoveries against a pharmaceutical
company in U.S. history while also being the first off-label promotion
settlement under the False Claims Act." 6 Due to the success of this
case, a new standard of accountability for pharmaceutical industry
marketing claims was established that could not have been accomplished
unless David Franklin blew the whistle.
The Franklin case was just the beginning of a long-term battle that
would continue over the next fifteen years and still be fought today.
Although Dr. Franklin was able to unveil fraudulent misconduct

109. See generally United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d 39, 45-46 (D.
Mass. 2001) (holding that if it could be proven that the off-label marketing of Neurontin caused
doctors to prescribe the drug and submit prescriptions to Medicaid, then the company would be
liable under the False Claims Act).
110. See id. at 45.
111. See id. at 48-49.
112. Id. at 49.
113. Id. at 45.
114. See John N. Joseph et al., Enforcement Related to Off-Label Marketing and Use of Drugs
and Devices: Where Have We Been and Where Are We Going?, 2 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 73, 95
(2009).
115. See David S. Torborg, The Dark Side of the Boom: The Peculiar Dilemma of Modern
False Claims Act Litigation, 26 J.L. & HEALTH 181, 195 (2013).
116. See id. at 194-95.
117. See Joseph et al., supra note 114, at 75-76.
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18
occurring by the pharmaceutical industry and its paid consultants,"
other companies were still committing crimes and getting away with
1 9
Due to the lack of whistleblower protections, these other
it.H
companies were still committing fraud that had gone largely unnoticed,
which was-and is still-having major adverse impacts on the general
population. 120 In a large amount of cases involving incidents in the
workplace, where employees who may have the most useful information
refuse to report or speak up because of fear of retaliation, the health and
welfare of the public remains at a grave risk. 121

B. The Effects ofFraudOccurringin the PharmaceuticalIndustry
The effects of a drug being adulterated into something it is not by
manufacturing giants in the pharmaceutical industry can be extremely
122
As seen most clearly in the
damaging to the population as a whole.
the healthcare system,
of
control
Franklin case, pharmaceutical
including doctors and pharmacists, resulted in a high number of patients
paying a great deal of money, for a drug that did nothing to help their
illness. 12 3 This is a prime example of just one way a person can be
124
The
greatly harmed by the misconduct that exists in such an industry.
deceive
to
only upside, however, is that Parke-Davis was only able
patients to a limited extent (most were only effected monetarily), and
12 5
In this
was later found and convicted of its fraudulent conduct.
their
of
effects
the
by
injured
deeply
or
killed
instance, nobody was
12 7
26
-but
truth
the
conductl -- due to the whistleblower who unmasked
the effects could have had significantly worse ramifications if the actions
118. See Franklin, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 52.
119. See, e.g., Neil Getnick, U.S. Whistleblower Cases Soar in Health and Pharma (Op-Ed),
LIVE SCIENCE (Oct. 3, 2014, 1:48 AM), http://www.livescience.com/48136-us-whistleblower-casesare-soaring.htm] (discussing endorsement from the Internal Revenue Service to further combat
companies such as Shire Pharmaceuticals, LLC, which paid $58,900,000 in a settlement).
120. Id.
121. Jennifer S. Bard, What to Do When You Can't Hear the Whistleblowing: A Proposalto
Protect the Public's Health by ProvidingWhistleblower Protectionfor Medical Researchers, 9 IND.
HEALTH L. REv. 1, 5 (2012).

122. See id. at 4-5; see also Joseph et al., supra note 114, at 75.
123. See Franklin, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 48-49.
124. See id.
125. See Joseph et al., supra note 114, at 95.
126. See, e.g., Franklin, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 48-49 (explaining that the essence of the Relator's
claim is that the company engaged in fraudulent conduct which included consciously making false
statements to physicians causing them to submit claims ineligible for payment by the government
under Medicaid).
127. See id.
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of the company had gone unchecked. 12 8
In 2004, the public indeed felt the effects of this exact same type of
activity in greater force when it was found that the manufacturers of the
drug Vioxx knew that the drug caused an increased risk of heart attack,
but it was still kept on the market for five years.1 29 After Merck released
the drug in 1999, reports began to come out from doctors and scientists
about how Vioxx had a tendency to increase the risk of heart attack for
patients taking the drug for less than two years. 130 In some studies, it
was even found that Vioxx could cause this risk for patients within the
first two weeks of taking the drug.' 3 1 These reports were denied and
suppressed until 2004 when Merck voluntarily pulled their drug from the
worldwide market.1 32 The ensuing result was the creation of a
multidistrict litigation (hereinafter "MDL") for potential claimants on a
nationwide scale.1 3 3 This lead to more than 60,000 claims being filed
against the company, resulting in 35,000 successful claims and the
creation of a $4.85 billion settlement fund.1 3 4 While seemingly a victory
for patients, the fact that 35,000 claims were found to be meritorious
means that a substantial portion of the public was actually and seriously
harmed by this drug.1 3 5 Had the doctors and scientists, or even regular
employees of Merck, been equipped with adequate whistleblower
protections at the outset-whether internally or externally-and felt
comfortable enough to report the wrongdoing earlier on, harm of this
extent could very likely have been avoided, or at least greatly
mitigated.'

6

Allowing private sector employees a guaranteed protection in the
event of a whistle-blow will significantly decrease the variety of
damaging effects that are now commonplace in the pharmaceutical
industry.1 37 For one, due to fraudulent misrepresentations, such as
128. See, e.g., Bard, supra note 121, at 10-11 (discussing the GlaxoSmithKline case in which
the company concealed known dangers of suicide by individuals using its drug Paxil).
129.

Vioxx,

What

is

it?

Its

Uses

and

Interactions,

DRUGWATCH,

https://www.drugwatch.com/vioxx/ (last updated Oct. 16, 2015).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See, e.g., David C. Radley et al., Off-label PrescribingAmong Office-Based Physicians,
166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1026, 1021 (2006) (supporting that damaging effects in the
pharmaceutical industry, such as off-label practices, should be given more attention in order to
protect both employees and consumers).
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fraudulent marketing practices, a company may mislabel prescription
medication and market the drug for one use when it is actually approved
for another use.13 8 People become victims of taking medicine they think
will help their conditions, but instead become severely injured as a result
of mislabeling, as was true for the 35,000 injured claimants in the Vioxx
litigation. 139 Second, fraud in the pharmaceutical industry greatly
impacts the government's Medicaid and Medicare expenses, costing
taxpayers billions of dollars, yet in the same respect decreasing the
industries' amounts owed to the states. 14 0 Third, pharmaceutical
industries are notorious for understating or overstating the efficiency of a
drug's use, despite a lack of supporting clinical data.1 4 1 Companies will
often make blanket statements or sweeping generalizations about a drug
to bolster its popularity, when there is in fact little or no clinical data to
support their claims. 14 2 Finally, the most common practice of off-label
marketing that is widely propagated in the pharmaceutical industry, as
well as some conspiring physicians and paid clinical consultants, is to
use off-label marketing to increase revenue while providing almost no
143
factual support to the off-label "capabilities" of the drug in question.
Unless the FDA has reviewed a company's clinical trial data to see if the
results support the drug for a specific use, that drug is not considered
safe or effective and will thus be subject to an off-label violation if
improperly represented.'" Although it is a nice thought that the FDA
will catch all of these harmful marketing, manufacturing, and
distributing practices, the reality is that they are unequipped to handle
the sheer depth of coverage necessary for this complete protection of
industry.1

45

In the more recent years, it has been evident that a failure to
whistle-blow in the pharmaceutical industry has also had a huge impact

138.

See

ISMP

Mission

and

Vision

Statement,

INST.

FOR

SAFE

MED.

PRAC.,

http://www.ismp.org/about/mission.asp (last visited Dec. 26, 2016).
139.

See id.; see, e.g., DRUGWATCH, supra note 129.

140. See Getnick, supra note 119.
141. Id.; see also United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d 39, 44-45 (D.
Mass. 2001).
142. See Franklin, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 48; Getnick, supra note 119.
143. See Radley etal., supranote 137.
144.

Development

&

Approval

Process

(Drugs),

FDA,

http://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/default.htm (last updated Jan. 29, 2016)
(explaining that before approval, drug manufacturers must submit evidence of testing to the FDA's
(CDER) for approval).
145. See Bard, supra note 121 at 66 (stating that "although the FDA has the authority to
regulate the research process and to monitor drug safety after approval, it has not exercised its
power in a way that adequately protects the public's health.").
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on the securities industry.146 Because of the misconceptions that are
perpetuated by pharmaceutical companies when they deceive the public
about the possible "revolutionary" expectations from these drugs, the
stock of that company rapidly increases.1 4 7 As public perception and
media hype for the prospect of a potential "blockbuster" drug grows, it
causes the companies market price to balloon. 148 Once the public
becomes aware of the false claims, and results are not being produced as
expected, the balloon pops and the stock price of that company rapidly
decreases.149 As a result, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(hereinafter "SEC") has been forced to take the reins and deal with many
pharmaceutical fraud cases over the past decade.150 These enforcement
efforts have been focused mainly on condemning the companies to
comply with FDA regulations in a hopeful attempt to prevent further
falsities from occurring.' 55
C. The Growing Trend to Stop a ReoccurringProblem
The question still lingers as to whether someday every industry in
the private sector will be subjected to the same consequences that the
CEO in Franklin encountered if they choose to act in a fraudulent
manner.152 In industries such as these that greatly involve the public
health and welfare, it is the duty of the federal government to enact
legislation that addresses concerns involving corporate corruption or
wrongdoing. 153 The creation of a uniform federal act, which would
provide adequate protections and incentives for employees who blow the
whistle on employers, would undoubtedly accomplish this goal. A piece
of legislation aimed at unifying and streamlining protections will also
alleviate the stress on agencies such as the FDA and SEC, which have
dumped countless resources into chasing and enforcing the harmful or
fraudulent activity of these companies. 154
146.

See

Pharmaceutical

Whistleblower

Protection,

SEC

WHISTLEBLOWER,

http://www.secwhistleblowerprogram.org/whistleblower-industries/pharmaceuticals
(last visited
Dec. 26, 2016).
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See Joseph et al., supranote 114 at 75.
153. See Zuckerman, supra note 5.
154. See, e.g., Joseph et al., supra note 114; see also Sec. Exch. Comm'n, FY 2016 Budget
Request By Program, https://www.sec.gov/about/reports/sec-fy2016-budget-request-by-program.pdf
(last visited Oct. 21, 2016) (explaining the difficulty, with numerous revisions to guidance, to
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This trend has seemingly already begun with the provisions enacted
recently by the SOX, affording legal protections to whistleblowers in
publicly traded companies for the very first time."'s The SOX grants
broad authority to enforcing the provisions aimed at protecting
whistleblowers. 15 6 In addition to widening the jurisdictional scope over
whistleblowers, the SOX also requires publicly traded companies to
develop independent "audit committees" and establish internal
whistleblower procedures aimed at protecting the confidentiality of
employees who file allegations against their employers. 157 As long as
this trend continues and meaningful efforts are taken to protect the rights
of employees,, issues affecting society such as health, safety, and
corporate corruption can be prevented by whistleblowers, and businesses
18
can finally be held accountable in new areas.
III. STATE ACTIONS TO PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF PRIVATE
EMPLOYEES AND THEIR INSUFFICIENCIES

A.

Enter: the States

Attempts by state legislation to afford protections to whistleblowers
in the private sector have had varying effects on the way employee's
rights are protected and the ways in which they are able to bring their
claims. 15 9 States, such as New York, California, Texas, and New Jersey,
address regulation of off-label use of products).
155. See Stephen Kohn, Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Legal Protectionfor Corporate Whistleblowers,
NAT'L

WHISTLEBLOWERS

CTR.,

27
(last visited
http://www.whistleblowers.org/index.php?optioncom-content&task-view&id=
Dec. 10, 2016).
156. "Section 3(b) of the SOX provides for a broad grant of jurisdictional authority for the SEC
and/or the Department of Justice to enforce (civilly or criminally) all of the requirements contained
in the SOX, including the four whistleblower-related provisions." Id. The law provides that:
A violation by any person of this Act [i.e., the SOX], any rule or regulation of
the Commission issued under this Act, or any rule of the Board shall be
treated for all purposes in the same manner as a violation of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.) or the rules and regulations
issued thereunder, consistent with the provisions of this Act, and any such
person shall be subject to the same penalties, and to the same extent, as for a
violation of that Act or such rules or regulations.
Id.
157. Id. at 1.
158. See Ravishankar, supra note 67.
159. See N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740 (McKinney 2015) (discussing, via federal/state statutes/cases,
an employee's protections for whistleblowing, and the scope of retaliatory action that can be taken
by an employer against an employee who engages in such behavior); Conscientious Employee
Protection Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-1 (West 2011); see also Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The
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all have inconsistent statutes-or lack thereof-which struggle to
promulgate adequate whistleblower protections for private sector
employees.160 Unfortunately, the irregularity of each state's laws do not
address the pharmaceutical industry, along with many other important
consumer industries, and are not effective in fully securing
whistleblowers in their efforts to express fraud and misconduct or ensure
uniform protection across the nation.16 ' The variety of laws that address
whistleblowers also create confusion and inconsistency in the
application of the law for protecting employees.1 62
B. Cases and the Effectiveness of Statutes in Protecting Private
Employee's Rights
An array of cases involving the effectiveness of state whistleblower
statutes, as they relate to illegal activities in the private sector, have
displayed the successes and failures of employee-plaintiffs in being able
to bring whistleblower claims across the U.S.1 63 First, New York has
whistleblower protections in place for private employees, such as the
New York False Claims Act State Finance Law.1 64 These laws,
however, are largely ineffective because they do not actually protect the
rights of employees.1 65
There is always some discrepancy that
invalidates the employee-plaintiff's claims and ultimately makes their
chances of prevailing very slim.' 66 For example, in Bordell v. Gen. Elec.
Co., the plaintiff alleged he was unlawfully discharged after he reported
alleged violations by his employer to the Department of Energy
(hereinafter "DOE").16 7 The report asserted that the plaintiffs employer
failed to record that certain employees were being exposed to radiation,
a requirement mandatory under the DOE.1 68 New York Labor Law

Incentives Matrix: The ComparativeEffectiveness of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protections

for Reporting Illegality, 88 TEx. L. REv. 1151, 1153-54 (2010).
160. See generally N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-1.
161. See generally N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-1.
162. See David Michaels, Assistant Secretary of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health,
Whistleblowers and OSHA: Strengthening Professional Integrity (May 11, 2010).
163. See, e.g., Bompane v. Enzolabs, Inc., 608 N.Y.S.2d 989, 991 (N.Y. 1994) (discussing the
conflicting and confusing definition of "public health" after employee reporting).
164. New York False Claims Act, N.Y. FIN. LAW. §§ 187-94 (Mckinney 2014).
165. See id. § 187 n. 2.
166. See, e.g., Bordell v. Gen. Elec. Co., 622 N.Y.S.2d 1001, 1003 (App. Div. 1995).
167. Id. at 1001.
168. "Rule 10 CFR 835.702 requires annual individual radiation exposure records to be
recorded. DOE Order 231.1B requires the reporting of monitoring results to the REMS Repository
in accordance with the specifications provided in REMS Reporting Guide." Occupational
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section 740(2)(a) provides that an employer shall not take any retaliatory
personnel action against an employee because such employee discloses,
or threatens to disclose, to a supervisor, or to a public body an activity,
policy, or practice of the employer that is in violation of a law, rule, or
regulation which violation creates and represents a substantial and
specific danger to the public health or safety.1 6 9 The plaintiff referenced
the Civil Service Law which allowed for "a reasonable belief' to be
sufficient in proving that a violation occurred.1 70 The court dismissed
the plaintiffs claim because no actual proof was provided, a necessary
17
factor under New York labor law.n
Many other cases in New York have ruled against employeeplaintiffs due in part either to elements not being fully satisfied under the
statute or simply a lack of sufficient evidence. 17 2 In Bompane v.
Enzolabs, Inc., the employee filed suit against the employer under New
York Labor Law section 740 173 claiming that she was fired in retaliation
for making a complaint to the county health department regarding the
employer's non-compliance with smoke-free work area rules under New
York Public Health Law sections 1399-o and 437-4.174 The court ruled
that the employer had a valid grounds for firing the employee-plaintiff
due to the fact that there was no finding of "substantial and specific
danger to the public health or safety." 17 5 Basically, the plaintiff blew the
whistle on dangerous activity in the workplace and was not protected by
any New York statute, because there was simply not enough apparent
danger.1 76 This growing trend of inadequate workplace protection
among employers in New York, and employers of other states shows the
need for a federal protection aimed at protecting workplace
whistleblowers. 177
http://energy.gov/ehss/policy-guidanceENERGY.GOv,
Exposure,
Radiation
reports/databases/occupational-radiation-exposure (last visited Dec. 18, 2016); see also Bordell, 622

N.Y.S.2d at 1001-02.
169. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(2)(a) (Mckinney 2015); Bordell, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 1002.
170. Bordell, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 1002.
171. Id.
172. See Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 149, 157 (2d Cir. 2015); Bompane v.
Enzolabs, Inc., 608 N.Y.S. 2d 989, 994 (N.Y. 1994); Bordell v. Gen. Elec. Co., 922 F.2d 1057, 1061
(2d Cir. 1991).
173. See Bompane, 608 N.Y.S. 2d at 990; N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(4).
174. See Bompane, 608 N.Y.S. 2d at 990; see also N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1399-o(a)
(2012); SUFFOLK COUNTY CODE§ 754-4 (2003).

175. Bompane, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 992 (citations omitted).
176. Id.
177. See, e.g., Hager v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 228 Cal. App. 4th 1538, 1541 (Cal. App. 2d
Dist.), as modified, (Aug. 19, 2014), reh'g denied, (Sept. 18, 2014), appeal denied, 2014 Cal.
LEXIS 10973 (Nov. 25, 2014); see also Berman, 801 F.3d at 155.
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California similarly provides another example of how seemingly
adequate state whistleblower laws can leave a concerned employee
exposed when attempting to report wrongdoing of their employer.178 In
California, protections for whistleblowers were significantly altered in
2014.179 The California Labor Code was edited to read:
[T]he purpose of [this statute] which is to encourage
workplace whistleblowers to report unlawful acts
without fearing retaliation. To establish a prima facie
case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that she
engaged in protected activity, that she was thereafter
subjected to adverse employment action by her
employer, and there was a causal link between the
two. 180

As a result of this addition, the Code created a prerequisite to
asserting a violation of section 1102.5.181 The perquisite created was
that there must be the existence of an employer-employee relationship at
the time the allegedly retaliatory action occurred.1 82 Although this
seems like a step in the right direction, California employees are still
fearful that whistleblowing may have serious retaliations, since there are
still many elements that must be satisfied before a claim can be properly
brought.1 8 3 Under the statute, employees must report the alleged
violation to a government or law enforcement agency in order to be
protected; therefore courts will likely not rule in an employee's favor if
the report was made internally to supervisors. 184 Also, there is still
uncertainty as to a whistleblower's fate if they are not the first to report
misconduct.' 85 For instance, in Hager v. County of Los Angeles, the
178. See, e.g., Hager, 228 Cal. App. 4th at 1549, 1552.
179. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5(4)(26) (2016).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See generally Filing a Whistleblower or Retaliation Claim-California, WORKPLACE
FAIRNESS, http://www.workplacefairness.org/whistleblower-retaliation-claim-CA (last visited Dec.
18, 2016); Eric Yoder, Surveys Show Fear Of Retaliation Keeps Would-Be Whistleblowers From
Speaking

Up,

THE

WASHINGTON

POST

(June

17,

2014),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/surveys-show-fear-of-retaliation-keeps-would-bewhistleblowers-from-speaking-up2014/06/17/9a574el2f66d-11e3-a606-946fd632f9fl.story.html
(explaining the level of protection California provides).
184.

See WORKPLACE FAIRNESS, supra note 183.

185. Hager v. City of Los Angeles, 228 Cal. App. 4th, at 1541, 1549, 1550 (Cal. App. 2d
Dist.), as modified, (Aug. 19, 2014), reh'g denied, (Sept. 18, 2014), appeal denied, 2014 Cal.
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defendant raised the issue of a "first report rule" in order to get the court
to dismiss plaintiffs retaliation claims. 186 Although he did not prevail,
many other plaintiffs in similar California cases have suffered the
repercussions of being a second reporter of a fraudulent scheme, and
thus, suffer as an unprotected party against retaliation.187 The argument
was that only the first person to report fraud will be protected from
retaliation, however everyone reporting after that is considered "fair
game."188

In complete contrast to the possibility of California's "fully"
protected workplace whistleblower statute, is the current condition of
Texas' whistleblower laws.189 In Texas, there is still no statute that
protects an employee who was unlawfully discharged from his
employment because he blew the whistle.' 90 Further outlining this
contention is Winters v. Houston Chronicle Pub. Co., where a Plaintiff
was fired from his employment with the Defendant, a private employer,
when he alleged that the Defendant engaged in criminally deceptive
trade practices.191 The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the firing, holding
that Texas, as an at-will employment state, only recognized wrongful
discharge by employers in general for an employee's refusing to perform
an illegal act, and from public employers under limited and wellspecified circumstances.1 92 The court declined to recognize a new
exception for wrongful discharge for private employers or extend the
current state of whistleblower protections in Texas. 193 There are no
protections for private employees prescribed by statute in Texas, but
rather a hodgepodge of varying public sector protections and common
law doctrine on wrongful discharge.194 In states like Texas, which has
no whistleblower protection statute for private sector employees, there
has been a push to combat the disparity of protections and
ineffectiveness of the law in this area by examining other effective

LEXIS 10973 (Nov. 25, 2014).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1551-52.
188. Id. at 1549.
189. See Katie Maxwell, Blowing the Whistle Falls on Deaf Ears: Revamping Texas's
Whistleblower Jurisprudence by Applying the Lessons of Garcetti and Sarbanes-Oxley, 43 TEX.

TECH L.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

REv. 647, 679 (2011).
Id. at 649-50, 685.
Winters v. Houston Chronicle Pub. Co., 795 S.W.2d 723, 723 (Tex. 1990).
Id. at 726.
Id. at 724.
Id. at 723-24; Texas Whistleblower Laws, FINDLAW, http://statelaws.findlaw.com/texas-

law/texas-whistleblower-laws.html (last visited Dec. 26. 2016).
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laws. 19 5 However, to this day there has still not been any adequate
protection enacted to protect these private sector employees.1 96
New Jersey state law protects employees for whistleblowing under
the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (hereinafter "CEPA"). 197
Under this statute, employees who wish to disclose, object to, or refuse
to participate in illegal activities, are protected from retaliation by their
employers. 198 It is sufficient that employees simply have the reasonable
belief that these activities are illegal or in violation of public policy.199
The CEPA is very protective of most employee decisions regarding
whistleblowing. However, New Jersey case law established that these
protections only exist when there is a significant harm posed to the
public.200 Private harm or harm posed to the complaining individual is
not enough.201
As demonstrated in Mehlman v. Mobil Oil Corp., the employeeplaintiff objected to a practice of his employer "that he reasonably
believed was incompatible with a clear mandate of public policy
designed to protect the public health and safety of citizens of another
country." 20 2 After reviewing the facts, the court found that the
retaliation inflicted upon him by his employer was a violation of the
CEPA. 203
Dr. MehIman, was an employee of Mobil's Medical
Department, responsible for ensuring environmental health and
regulating toxicology tests for the company.204 After a business trip to
Japan, Mehiman discovered that the gasoline that was to be used in a
major business transaction, was in fact very harmful to humans due to
the high percentage of benzene.2 05 Mehilman was terminated from his
employment at Mobil soon after his discovery and subsequent reporting
of the hazardous gasoline.206. Although Mobil argued that Mehlman was
terminated "for cause," MehIman insisted that his rights under CEPA
195. Maxwell, supra note 189 at 658, 661.
196. See id. at 685.
197. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:19-1-34:19-8 (West 2011).
198. Id. § 34:19-3.
199. Id. § 34:19-3 cmt. 16.
200. See Barratt v. Cushman & Wakefield of New Jersey, Inc., 675 A.2d 1094, 1098 (N.J.
1996) (finding that the plaintiffs whistleblowing affected the real estate market as a whole, rather
than the specific employer).
201. See id. at 1100 (distinguishing the plaintiff from those in cases where the whistleblower's
actions affected only one specific employer).
202. Mehlman v. Mobil Oil Corp., 707 A.2d 1000, 1001 (N.J. 1998).
203. Id. at 1015.
204. Id. at 1001-02.
205. Id.at 1003.
206. Id. at 1004.
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were violated.20 7 MehIlman had the burden of proving a violation of
CEPA occurred, and during trial he "introduced several guidelines,
regulations, treatises and other sources to establish a clear mandate of
public policy concerning the public health, safety or welfare." 208 The
court ruled in Mehlman's favor, affirming a generous amount of
damages previously awarded following a trial by jury. 209 In this case,
there was a clear harm that was posed to the public. However, plaintiffs
in cases such as Barratt v. Cushman, that bring claims against their
private sector employers, are not as likely to prevail when there is a
different type of harm that. is being instituted. 2 10 Robert Barratt, a
partner in one of the most exclusive real estate agencies in Jersey City,
drafted a letter to the real estate commission advising them that a broker
in his agency had been found guilty of misconduct. 2 11 Barratt had sent
this letter against the advice of Cushman & Wakefield's attorney, and
shortly thereafter was fired by his employer for notifying the
212
commission of such activity.22 Barratt decided to bring action against
his employer, stating in essence that he was discharged unlawfully under
CEPA.2 13 After much discussion, the Court decided that although
Barratt was definitely harmed because he was retaliated against for
whistleblowing on his employer, but he was not protected under
CEPA. 2 14 CEPA sought to discourage behavior that would harm the
public welfare, as demonstrated in Mehlam. 215 Because the only harm
here was Barratt being threatened by his employer's misconduct in a
private capacity, rather than there being some harm to the public,
Barratt's claim would afford him no remedies by the court.2 16
C. To Apply or Not to Apply State Logic-That is the Question
The attempts by different states to create whistleblower protection
laws for private-sector employees is a start to the idea that a federal

207. Id. at 1001, 1004.
208. Id. at l017.
209. Id.
210. Compare id., with Barratt v. Cushman & Wakefield of New Jersey, Inc., 675 A.2d 1094,
1098 (N.J. 1996).
211. Barratt,675 A.2d at 1096.
212. Id. at 1096-97.
213. Id. at 1097.
214. Id. at 1098.
215. Id. (citations omitted); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-1 cmt. 1 (West 2011).
216. Barratt,675 A.2d at 1097.
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mandate should be created. 2 7 However, providing protection to
whistleblowers through specific provisions in different laws of different
states constitutes a fragmented approach and results in protection of only
specific persons or for the reporting of specific offenses.218 For
example, as was demonstrated by New Jersey's attempt to create a
cohesive whistleblower law, the CEPA is a protection to encourage
employees in the private sector to report illegal and unethical work place
activities; however, it only protects those employees who can prove a
significant harm is posed to the public. 2 19 This varies greatly from the
complete lack of protections whistleblowers in Texas receive. 22 0 The
discrepancies between these two systems are echoed throughout the
United States for whistleblowers, and end up leaving private sector
employees with differing levels of rights and protections, depending on
the state they happen to live.and work in.221
Due to the lack of uniformity amongst the states, employees are left
with uncertainty regarding their state's statutes and whether or not they
are being afforded protections. 222 Because employee confusion is a
trend occurring throughout the United States regarding ununiformed
whistleblower laws, it is important that all employees are not only
afforded protections, but that those protections are complete and
absolute when discussing the coverage of persons.223 For example, first,
all workers should be covered by a strict whistleblowing statute that will
protect all people who decide to report misconduct within their industry,
whether that industry be within a public or private sector.224 It can be
argued that even participants in an industry, those who are not
necessarily employees working for a pay or salary, should also be
afforded protections.225 This added provision is necessary because
misconduct can occur in the face of those who do not technically work
for an organization, but may be aware of possible misconduct due to
their participation and therefore presence in the industry.226 Also, it is

217. Maxwell, supra note 189 at 668; Rachel Replogle,. Overview of Federal Whistleblower
Regulations,
ASS'N
OF
CORP.
COUNS.
(Feb.
9,
2011),
http://www.acc.com/legalresources/quickcounsel/whistleblowing.cfm.
218. OECD, supra note 58 at 9.
219. Barratt,675 A.2d at 1094.
220.

Maxwell, supranote 189.

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

See id. at 668; Barratt,675 A.2d at 1094.
See OECD, supra note 58 at 9.
See id.

Id.
Id.
See id.
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essential that whistleblower protection laws provide an outline
demonstrating viable causes of action an employee can raise when he or
she suspects misconduct within their workplace.227 A law that solely
limits the claims a whistleblower can raise to corruption is not sufficient
enough to be fully protective. 22 8 Finally, the whistleblowing laws
should contain narrow provisions that specifically express what
whistleblowing is and the exact protections one will be afforded for
taking such action against their place of work or place of participation.229
The wide variation of state statutes and common law doctrine create
an invariable environment of subpar protections where employees
cannot feel confident in reporting information about the malfeasance of
their employer.2 30 If fear and uncertainty about an employee's job
security and financial future rules their decision-making process when it
comes to reporting corrupt or illegal practices of employers, a dangerous
game is being played with the health and welfare of the public.2 31
Although these state laws afford some level of protection to private
whistleblowers, the success rate and awareness of these protections is
not nearly as prevalent as it could or should be when dealing with the
sensitive issue of employees' rights.232 Additionally, the varying
protections from state-to-state lead to inconsistent results across the
United States and do not instill confidence in reporting systems.233 The
ever-present threat of retaliation and being shunned from an industry
looms over the head of the altruistic employee like a dark cloud, looking
to rain down stigmatization and financial instability if they report
employer wrongdoing.234 It is evident that efforts of the federal
government, however, can put an end to this reign.

227. See id.
228. See id.at 11.
229. Id. at 10-11.
230. See Francie Grace, What Happens to Whistleblowers?, CBS NEWS (Feb. 5, 2002, 5:18
PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/what-happens-to-whistleblowers/.

231.

See id.

232.

See Michaels, supra note 162.

233. See id.
234. Ben Hallman, Whistleblowers, Beware: Most Claims End in Disappointment, Despair,
PM),
4:15
2012,
4,
(June
POST
HUFFINGTON
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/04/whistleblower-law-false-claims-act-awards-jamesholzrichter n_1563783.html.
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IV. EFFORTS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
WI{JSTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS TO PRIVATE EMPLOYEES
A.

[Vol. 34:1
TO

EXTEND

The Legislative Road Thus Far

Efforts have been taken by both the state and federal legislature to
extend protection to the private sector, 235 but they remain largely
ineffective in actually protecting employees and incentivizing them to
speak out against employers.2 36 This is due mainly to the private costs
and barriers associated with being a whistleblower, and the inadequacy
of current federal legislation to address this issue. 237 Atop the long list
of private costs an employee must take into consideration before
blowing the whistle is fear for their economic future.238
Many
employees have reconsidered reporting the bad acts of their employers
after contemplating the future ramifications such actions could pose to
their careers.239
In two separate instances, the lives of two whistleblowers and their
families were jeopardized after reporting corporate wrongdoing.240 In
2005, James Holzrichter was awarded $6.2 million for his participation
in revealing that his employer, Northrup Grumman, had been
intentionally inflating the pricing of their products and lying about the
progress of their projects. 24 1 Before he actually received this award,
however, Holzrichter had to wait sixteen years for a settlement to be
reached and the money to be disbursed.242 During this time, he and his
family suffered a great deal, which was attributable to his involvement
as a whistleblower.24 3 He was unable to find work as an auditor,
presumably because of the stigma associated with his name after he
235. See generally OSHA, The Whistleblower Protections Program: Statutes, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, http://www.whistleblowers.gov/statutes~page.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2016) (enforcing
protective workplace health and safety standards).
236. Higginbottom, supra note 66.
237. Depoorter & De Mot, supra note 9 ("[A] whistle blower faces substantial financial and
other risks. Evidence thresholds and imperfect enforcement leave the whistle blower vulnerable to
retaliation (e.g.[,] harassment, threats of termination, suspension, non-promotion, reassignment,
transfer, denial of training, withholding wages or other benefits, closer supervision and scrutiny, or
pestering). Former employees are stigmatized and black listed on the job market as whistle blowers.
The private costs of the whistle blower may thus prevent disclosure of insider information at the
socially optimal time.").
238. Id. at 159.
239. Higgins & Summers, supra note 66.
240. Hallman, supra note 234.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. See id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol34/iss1/6

28

Delorantis and Kalkanis: Can You Blow My Whistle? A Harmonious Marriage of State Legislati

CAN YOU BLOWMY WHISTLE?

2016]

189

reported his former employer.244 After receiving 400 rejection letters,
Holzrichter had to resort to scrubbing toilets and delivering newspapers
to provide for his family.24 5 At one point, he was even forced to move
his family into a homeless shelter because of his dire financial condition
and inability to find other work.24 6 If having to deal with seeing his
family endure this lifestyle for sixteen years was not enough, when the
settlement finally concluded, Holzrichter only received $2.3 million of
the award after attorney's fees and taxes were deducted.247
Similarly in 2007, Kyle Lagow, a former supervisor for a subsidiary
of Countrywide, sued Countrywide alleging that they had pressured
appraisers into committing widespread fraud and falsely inflating
mortgage values.248 In the years leading up to receipt of his $14.5
million award-which was similarly reduced to a small fraction of a
principal due to taxes and attorney's fees-Lagow and his family
suffered from poverty and hardship because of Lagow's inability to
obtain work.249 Stricken with cancer and unable to find work, Lagow
was thrust into the same situation he was trying to avoid for others by
250
whistleblowing; he was forced into foreclosing on his house.
Although both of these whistleblowers eventually saw portions of their
awards,251 the stories of hardship and stress not only on themselves, but
on their families, may be crippling to future employees considering
whether it is actually worth it to blow the whistle.
Most of the current federal laws that address private-sector
25 2
most of which only allow
whistleblowers contain damages provisions,

244. See id.
245. See id.
246. Id.
247. Id. When asked whether his experience was worth it, Holzrichter stated: "I don't know if
it was worth it. I have the money, but how can I give my children their childhood back?" Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.; Rick Rothacker, A Whistleblower Emerges from the Shadows, REUTERS (July 12,
2012,

8:05

PM),

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-bankofamerica-whistleblower-

idUSBRE86BIFN20120713.
252. Federal acts that provide damages to private-sector whistleblowers include: the Clean Air
Act, Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act, Consumer Financial Protection Act, Consumer Product
Safety Act, Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1987, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, FDA Food Safety Modernization
Act, Federal Railroad Safety Act, Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act,
Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21' Century Act, National Transit Systems Security Act, Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pipeline Safety Improvement Act, Safe Drinking Water Act,
and SOX, Seaman's Protection Act, Toxic Substances Control Act, and the Wendell H. Ford
Aviation Investment and Reform Act of the 21' Century. JON 0. SHIMAKBUKURO, L. PAIGE
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for reinstatement and/or back pay. 253 Probably the most progressive of
the acts in terms of attempting to incentivize employees has been the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(hereinafter "Dodd-Frank Act").25 4 The Dodd-Frank Act provides
damages available to employees in relevant part as follows: "An
individual who prevails in a whistleblower action will be awarded
reinstatement, back pay with interest, and compensation for any special
damages sustained as result of the discharge or discrimination, including
litigation costs and reasonable attorney's fees."255 It goes on further to
explain that "[a]n individual who prevails in a [whistleblower] action
under Section 21F ... is entitled to reinstatement, two times the amount
of back pay otherwise owed to the individual, including interest, and
compensation for litigation costs, expert witness fees, and reasonable
expenses. ,,256 The purpose and effect of the "doubling" damages
provision in this act is most in line with the type of motivation that
employees in the private sector have been shown to be responsive to.2 57
Under this attempted reform of the securities .industry, the pot is,
essentially, sweetened for whistleblowers who observe financial
misconduct and are considering reporting.258 None of the acts, however,
including the recent whistleblower provisions added to the SOX and
Dodd-Frank Act, provide a model by which an employee can obtain a
percentage of the fines imposed upon their employer. 2 59 Additionally,
the acts do not address any of the areas of private industry where
whistleblower protections may be needed most.260
In the fall of 2008, the American financial regulatory system was
wHITAKER & EMILY E. ROBERTS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43045, SURVEY OF FEDERAL
WHISTLEBLOWER
AND
ANTI-RETALIATION
LAWS
3-53
(2013),
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43045.pdf [hereinafter SHIMABUKURO & WHITAKER, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV.].

253. Id.
254. Justin Blount & Spencer Markel, The End of the InternalCompliance World as We Know
it, or an Enhancement of the Effectiveness of Securities Law Enforcement? Bounty Hunting Under

the Dodd-FrankAct's Whistleblower Provisions, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1023, 1034-36
(2012) ("The design of the Dodd-Frank bounty program borrows the successful aspects of its
predecessors while rectifying the significant flaws that rendered other programs ineffective. The
combination of fortified job security and potentially huge cash bounties, reminiscent of other similar
programs, will undoubtedly catch the eye of thousands of potential bounty hunters.").
255.

SHIMABUKURO & WHITAKER, AN OVERVIEW, supranote 78, at 5.

256. Blount & Markel, supra note 254 (emphasis added).
257. See, e.g., Ryan Abbott, Big Data and Pharmacovigilance: Using Health Information
Exchanges to Revolutionize Drug Safety, 99 IOWA L. REV. 225, 264-65 (2013).
258. See id.
259.

See SHIMABUKURO & WHITAKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 252 at 1-14.

260. See id.
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26 1
Major
broken due to the lack of oversight throughout all operations.
investment bankers took excessive risks with little to no direction, which
262
was a main cause of the drastic decline that occurred in our system.
For example, risks taken by irresponsible lenders forced many
consumers into immense debt and later bankruptcy. 2 63 As a result,
2
Americans were left unemployed and subsequently in massive debt. 6
In an attempt to remedy and prevent this disaster from ever occurring
again, President Barack Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Act into federal
law on July 21, 2010.265 The Dodd-Frank Act, also known as "[t]he
66
most far reaching Wall Street reform in history," 2 was established to
prevent excessive risk-taking in the American financial regulatory
267
The Doddsystem that, once upon a time, led to the financial crisis.
change the
stability,
Frank Act included provisions to enforce financial
bank regulatory structure, and increase oversight on insurance
policies. 268 Amongst these additions, the requirement to provide
protections to consumers and capital markets was also drafted.269
Within this provision, Title IX of the Dodd-Frank Act was created to:

strengthen[] the regulatory oversight of securities and
capital markets activities by the SEC, and create[] new
protections for investors in the form of increased private
rights of action, the broadened ability of the SEC to
bring aiding-and-abetting claims against violators of the
federal securities laws, and directing the SEC to study
and perhaps create a federal fiduciary duty for brokerdealers, akin to that for investment advisers, to protect
retail customers.270

261.

See

Wall

Street

Reform:

The

Dodd-Frank

Act,

THE

WHITE

HOUSE,

https://www.whitehouse.gov/economy/middle-class/dodd-frank-wall-street-reform (last visited Dec.
8, 2016) (stating that the condition America was in during the fall of 2008 was "a financial crisis of
a scale and severity not seen in generations").
262. Id.
263. See id.
264. See id.
265. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12.U.S.C. § 5301 (2012).
266.

THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 261.

267. See id
268. Understanding the New Financial Reform Legislation: The Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform

and

Consumer

Protection

Act,

. MAYER

BROWN

2-4,

6

(July

2010),

https://www.mayerbrown.com/public-docs/Final-FSRE-Outline.pdf
269. Id. at 4.
270. Id. at 5.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2016

31

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 6

192

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENTLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 34:1

In essence, Title IX was a revolutionary amendment to the DoddFrank Act, giving the SEC the power to create an Investor Protection
Fund 27 1 that would incentivize people with evidence regarding securities
related violations to come forward and also be used as a reward for said
whistleblowers who provide information regarding an SEC action.272
The Dodd-Frank Act is known to be one of the most progressive of
the acts mostly because of the incentive program it provides.27 3 As
aforementioned, the Act allows for employees to report securities related
violations with the promise of an established pay-out by the SEC as
provided by Title IX. 2 74 More specifically, Subtitle B of the 1934
Securities and Exchange Act was amended to provide the SEC with a
"whistleblower bounty program."275 This bounty program allows an
individual to be awarded an aggregate amount of money if they
"voluntarily provided original information to the Commission that led to
the successful enforcement of the covered judicial or administrative
action...."2 7 6

The

statute further provides that the amount a

whistleblower can be awarded for such acts is dependent upon the
amount of monetary sanctions collected upon judgment of the court.277
For example, an individual cannot collect less than ten percent or more
than thirty percent of the sanctions awarded. 27 8 Further, the statute
explains how the Commission is given the final discretion in
determining whether more or less awards should be given to the
individual whistleblowers.279 Under their discretion, the amount of
money to be awarded is generally determinative on factors that the
Commission has outlined, such as: how significant the information
provided by the whistleblower proves to be, how much assistance the
whistleblower provided, and the degree of the whistleblower's
participation in internal compliance systems.2 80
271. Id. at 105.
272. Id.
273. See id.; see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C.
§ 5301 (2012).
274.

See MAYER BROWN, supra note 268.

275. Lloyd B. Chinn & Harris M. Mufson, SEC Issues Interpretive Rule Regarding Definition
of
Dodd-Frank
"Whistleblower,"
PROSKAUER
ROSE
(Aug.
7,
2015),
http://www.proskauer.com/publications/client-alert/sec-issues-interpretive-rule-regarding-

definition-of-dodd-frank-whistleblower/.
276. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1) (2012).
277. Id. at § 78u-6(b)(1)(A).
278. Id. at § 78u-6(b)(1)(B).
279. Id. at § 78u-6(c)(1)(A).
280. Id. at § 78u-6(c)(1)(B); Sean McKessy, What Happens to Tips, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMMissioN, https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/owb-what-happens-to-tips.shtml (last visited
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According to Sean McKessy, the Chief of the SEC's Office of the
Whistleblower, a person submitting a specific, timely, and credible tip of
281 By
an alleged securities violation is given the upmost anonymity.
law, the SEC is required to keep the whistleblower's identity completely
protected, thus ensuring that no information can be distributed that may
incriminate such a person.282 This enables a whistleblower to remain
2 83
The tip
fully protected throughout the potential investigation.
if it
determine
provided will be evaluated by the SEC and its attorneys to
284
Of course,
contains anything viable to bring a case of substance.
an
Commission,
the
by
alleged
be
can
wrongdoing
any
before
285
the
investigates
SEC
the
when
and
If
investigation must take place.
tip, and a sanction over one million dollars is then charged, the
286
whistleblower can finally recover for the information given.
Additionally, the law also provides SEC whistleblowers job protection
287
and a sense of confidentiality for the information that was exchanged.
The bounty program, created by the Dodd-Frank Act and enforced
by the SEC, has proven widely 288successful since its creation for
In fact, on January 15, 2016, the
whistleblowers sharing information.
of more than $700,000 given to
award
SEC announced a whistleblower
an individual who provided detailed information to the SEC regarding a
securities violation in a corporation that led to a successful enforcement
action.289 The Press Release boasted how "[t]he SEC's whistleblower
program has paid more than $55 million to 23 whistleblowers since the
program's inception in 2011.,,290
The bounty program created by the Dodd-Frank Act and enforced
by the SEC was a great start to incentivize individuals to come forward
with possible securities violations. 2 91 The SEC has stated that full
protections are afforded to whistleblowers to maintain their anonymity
Dec. 23, 2016).
281. McKessy, supra note 280.
282. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Awards Whistleblower More Than
$700,000 for Detailed Analysis (Jan. 15, 2016) (on file with author).
283. Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(2)(A).
284. McKessy, supra note 280.
285. Id.
286. See id. (noting that once the case is posted on the SEC website, the whistleblower "will
have 90 days to submit a Form WB-APP to apply for an award").
287. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(2)(A).
288. See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, supra note 282.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. See id. (discussing the success of the bounty program through money being awarded to
those providing "unique and useful information that leads to a successful enforcement action").
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and confidentiality, however this statement is dubious.29 2 This program
has been proven to be ununiformed throughout the various Circuits,
most notably the Second and Fifth Circuits, because of the various
interpretations each court applies when determining how much
protection a whistleblower is actually given.293 Due to this lack of
consistency among the Courts, a person may still face retaliation by
employers when they report an alleged securities violation.294 The
division between the courts was most notably recorded in two cases,
Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy, LLC 295 and Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA),
LLC. 2 96 In Berman, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held in 2015
that an employee "is entitled to pursue Dodd-Frank remedies for alleged
retaliation after his report of wrongdoing to his employer, despite not
having reported to the Commission before his termination., 2 97 The
Berman decision was one the majority of district courts had agreed with
in the past. 2 98 Due to this agreement, Berman, as a whistleblower, would
be allowed to pursue Dodd-Frank remedies for alleged retaliation, even
though he did not report to the SEC before the alleged retaliation
occurred. 2 99 This decision was completely different from Asadi, a Fifth
Circuit case, where the court had decided two years prior that the plain
language written in the statute should be interpreted to mean that only
those who blow the whistle externally by providing information to the
SEC will be protected under the anti-retaliation provision. 300 Until the
Supreme Court is able to determine one uniform law regarding which
classes of whistleblowers may use the anti-retaliation provision against
292. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(2)(A); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-7 (2011) (listing the
exceptions as to when the Commission may disclose a whistleblower's identity).
293. See Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 153-54 (2d Cir. 2015) (discussing the
conflicting results among courts when encountering this issue); see also Asadi v. G.E. Energy
(USA), LLC, 720 F.3d 620, 630 (5th Cir. 2013) (reaching a different conclusion than that of
Berman on this issue). Both show that each circuit has a different interpretation of the antiretaliation provision when determining whether a whistleblower will be protected from possible
backlash by an employer in the event of a successful whistleblow.
294. See Berman, 801 F.3d at 154-55 (dealing with an employee who had faced retaliation
from his employer).
295. Id.
296. Asadi, 720 F.3d at 630.
297. Berman, 801 F.3d at 155.
298. Second Circuit Creates Second Circuit Creates Circuit Split on the Question of Whether
Internal Reporting Triggers Whistleblower Anti-Retaliation Protection under Dodd-Frank,

DEBEVOISE
at
3-4
(Sept.
11,
2015),
http://www.debevoise.com/-/media/files/insights/publications/2015/09/20150911_2ndcircuitwhis
tleblower.pdf
299. Berman, 801 F.3d at 155.
300. Asadi, 720 F.3d at 630.
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their employers, employees are faced with inconsistent levels of
301
protections based solely on the jurisdiction they happen to be in.
The pharmaceutical industry has also benefited from the creation of
the Dodd-Frank Act, because it has allowed scientists, mathematicians,
and other pharmaceutical insiders the protection of anonymously
disclosing misconduct relating to corporate fraud or securities fraud
within the industry.3 02 However those benefits are meant to extend
mainly to the public sector employees in the industry. It is still an issue
of concern that private sector employees working in the pharmaceutical
industry are afforded very little federal protections in the event of a
whistle-blow.3 03
By increasing the protections given to private employees by statute
and essentially sweetening the pot through an incentives or bounty
program, employees will be more likely to expose corrupt or illegal
practices of employers. '0 A system which provides financial incentives
along with increased protections has been an effective tool in motivating
employees to blow the whistle.305 In 2009, a former sales representative
for Pfizer collected over $50 million stemming from his participation in
30 6
In the same
uncovering Pfizer's fraudulent healthcare practices.
settlement, six other whistleblowers received a collective of more than
30 7
Although this action
$100 million for their roles played in the case.
301. DEBEVOISE, supra note 298 at 1, 4 (stating that the ultimate decision will be left up to the
United States Supreme Court to decide). Employers should also be wary of the circuit split for the
possible consequences when using measures similar to retaliation towards their employees after a
whistle blow. Id.
302.

Pharmaceutical

Whistleblower

Protection,

SEC

WHISTLEBLOWER,

(last visited
http://www.secwhistleblowerprogram.org/whistleblower-industries/pharmaceuticals
Dec. 28, 2016).
303. See John Rouse, Whistleblower Protections for FDA and Private-Sector Employees 65
(April 25, 2005) (unpublished third year paper, Harvard University) (on file with Digital Access to
Scholarship at Harvard), http://nrs.harvard.edulurn-3:HUL.InstRepos:8965545.
304. Marsha J. Ferziger & Daniel G. Currell, Snitchingfor Dollars: The Economics and Public
Policy of Federal Civil Bounty Programs, 99 U. ILL. L. REV. 1141, 1141 (1999); Geoffrey
Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection: Invigorating Incentives for Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate and
SecuritiesFraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REv. 91, 92 (2007).
305. Abbott, supra note 257; Marsha J. Ferziger & Daniel G. Currell, Snitching for Dollars:
The Economics and Public Policy ofFederal Civil Bounty Programs,99 U. ILL. L. REv. 1141, 1141
(1999); Marianne Jennings, Ethical Issues: Does Dodd-Frank Countermand Sarbanes-Oxley? On
Whistleblowers and Internal Controls, CORP. FIN. REV., Jan./Feb. 2011, at 2, 2011 WL 11562051;
Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection: Invigorating Incentives for Sarbanes-Oxley

Corporateand SecuritiesFraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REV. 91, 92 (2007).
306. Gardiner Harris, Pfizer Pays $2.3 Billion to Settle Marketing Case, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/03/business/03health.htmnl?_r-O.
307. Id. Top marketing executive, George Cuoto, was also involved in blowing the whistle on
a separate drug company, Bayer, for attempting to defraud Medicare. Jennings, supra note 305. He
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was related to a private company defrauding public healthcare
systems,308 the method used to incentivize employees was proven to be
an effective motivator in encouraging employees to speak out against the
illegal practices of their employers.30 9
B. Barriersin the ReportingProcess
In addition to being discouraged from whistleblowing by a lack of
incentivization, employees in the private sector often lose confidence in
the reporting system due to a variety of barriers they face when
attempting to whistle-blow. 3 10 Before most whistleblowers can actually
bring their claims, a case investigator is typically assigned to assess the
merit of each individual claim.31 ' These case investigators, however, are
often inundated with more cases than they can deal with, leading to a
large delay in investigation times.312
In many cases, a single
investigation can take almost a half a year to reach resolution.
This is
due mainly to the fact that these case investigators, on average, are
assigned three times as many claims to investigate than the accepted,
manageable caseload that they were meant to handle.3 14 Even if
whistleblowers manage to make it over this hurdle and their claims are
preserved, only about three percent of those claims end up being found
to have merit. 1 To make matters worse, only about twenty percent of
those three percent of claims end up reaching resolution.316 In
addressing Professionals for the Public Interest, the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (hereinafter "OSHA") Assistant Secretary of
Labor stated:

received twenty-four percent of the $257 million settlement with Bayer as a result of his cooperation
with the government in the suit. Id.
308. The pharmaceutical companies in these instances defrauded Medicare, Medicaid, and
state healthcare systems by off-label marketing of drugs, inflating the prices of drugs, and
participating in kick-back programs. Id.; Harris, supra note 306.
309. Harris, supra note 306.
310. Michaels, supra note 162.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Case investigators are typically assigned seventeen cases, when the "accepted,
manageable caseload" is meant to be set at six to eight cases per investigator. Id. This is due mainly
to programs being underfunded to begin with and then the workforce continuing to be overburdened

by additional responsibilities, with little to no increase in funding. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
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I do not believe that the vast majority of whistleblower
claims are simply without merit. Instead, it appears to
me that there are a series of institutional, administrative
and legislative barriers that stand between many
whistleblowers and justice. These barriers, and our
failure to protect legitimate whistleblowers creates an
injustice for these workers, and it discourages other
workers from asserting rights . . When two-thirds of
whistleblower complaints are dismissed, it sends
workers a clear message-a very unfortunate message:
"The odds are against you." 317
When meritorious claims are falling by the wayside and employees
are feeling like "the odds are against them," 3 18 a dangerous message is
being sent to employers that they do not have to take considerable care
in the way they are treating their employees or the manner in which they
are conducting their business.
C. Federal Attempts at Creating a Uniform Law for Private
Whistleblowers
In an attempt to establish widespread protections for whistleblowers
in the private sector, the Private Sector Whistleblower Protection
Streamlining Act of 2007319 was introduced to Congress in 2007 and
then re-introduced in 2012, under a similar name. 32 0 Although this piece
of legislation was ultimately not enacted,321 its focus was geared towards
providing "whistleblower protections for private sector, state, and
municipal employees who are retaliated or discriminated against by an
employer for disclosing threats to public safety or violations of federal
law." 32 2 Rather than having twenty-two individual pieces of federal
legislation that addressed varying areas of the private sector, this act

317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Private Sector Whistleblower Streamlining Act of 2007, H.R. 4047, 110th Cong. (1st
Sess. 2007).
320. The same bill was introduced to Congress five years later under the name "Private Sector
Whistleblower Protection Streamlining Act of 2012." Private Sector Whistleblower Protection
Streamlining Act of 2012, H.R. 6409, 112th Cong. (2d Sess. 2012).
321. Id.
322. H.R. 6409 (112th): Private Sector Whistleblower Protection StreamliningAct of 2012,
Gov TRACK, http://www.govtrack.us/copgress/bills/112/hr6409/summary (last visited Dec. 28,
2016).
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would have consolidated the protections, defined the covered industries,
and created a centralized administrative agency to monitor and regulate
whistleblowing.32 3 This would have ensured universal protection for
both public and private employees who make the decision to blow the
whistle, while also clarifying the protocol for whistleblowers to follow if
they wish to file a claim. 324 The Act would have also created a branch of
Department of Labor to handle and streamline whistleblower claims,
appropriately named the Whistleblower Protection Office.325
While the job of the Whistleblower Protection Office has been
assumed by OSHA,326 the issue of statutory uniformity and clarity still
remains.327 Even though there are reporting protocols set in place by the
current piecemeal of private protections, 328 and a regulatory body in
place to enforce them, 32 9 properly navigating through the variety of
statutes can be difficult because they are often very complex and contain
potential pitfalls for employees looking to receive any sort of
compensation or otherwise. 3 30 For example, an employee may be barred
from bringing their claim if they are unaware of different filing periods
and wait too long to bring their claim against their employer.331 While
the window of opportunity to bring a claim in some instances may be as
much as 180 days, in other instances the filing window period may be as
little as thirty days.332 This leads to many employees either missing their
opportunity or hastily filing without adequate enough information to
properly develop their claim.333 In a 2010 presentation, the Assistant
Secretary of Labor at OSHA, David Michaels, was quoted saying:

323.
324.
325.

See H.R. 6409.
Id.
Id.

326.

See

The

Whistleblower

Protections

Programs,

U.S.

DEP'T

OF

LAB.,

http://www.whistleblowers.gov (last visited Dec. 26, 2016).
327. See Administrative Conference of the United States, Recommendation 87-2: Federal
Protection

of

Private

Sector

Health

and

Safety

Whistleblowers,

https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/87-2_0.pdf (last visited Dec. 26, 2016).
328. Michaels, supra note 162.
329. See The Whistleblower ProtectionsPrograms,supra note 326.
330. Natalie Arbaugh, Whistleblowers Need to Prepare When Exposing Employer
Wrongdoing, EXPERT BEACON, http://expertbeacon.com/whistleblowers-need-prepare-whenexposing-employer-wrongdoing/#.VlPiAnarTIU (last visited Dec. 21, 2016).
331. OSHA Fact Sheet: Your Rights as a Whistleblower, supra note 94.
332. For example, an employee looking to bring a claim of retaliation against an employer
under the SOX or the Dodd-Frank Act has a window of 180 days to bring their claim, whereas the
same employee looking to bring the same claim under the Occupational Safety and Health Act or
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act will only have a 30 day window to appropriately bring their
claim. Id.
333. Michaels, supra note 162.
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I'd like to say that all our whistleblower cases conclude
as satisfactorily as these cases, and that workers
nationwide feel emboldened to speak out. Sadly, the
news is otherwise. Any review of the whistleblower
protections will reveal a patchwork of laws protecting
whistleblowers that has resulted in inconsistent,
confusing and sometimes contradictory provisions.3 34
Assistant Secretary Michaels goes on to explain the flaw in private
sector whistleblower laws by ..stating: "[a]long with an inconsistent,
confusing collection of provisions, we find unsatisfying outcomes of
complaints. Too few complaints are reaching resolutions intended by
the whistleblower protections." 335 Citing the inconsistencies between
336
as a major hindrance on the effectiveness of the statute's
programs,
whistleblower cases being properly disposed of, Assistant Secretary
Michaels, also stated that "[t]here is little question that more change is
coming" in terms of whistleblower reform.337
Keeping in line with the words of Assistant Secretary Michaels, the
Supreme Court, in a recent 2014 decision, extended whistleblower
protection to employees in the financial industry whose private
employers engage in activities serving public companies. 3 38 The Court
in Lawson v. FMR LLC 33 9 held that employees of private contractors and
sub-contractors doing business in the public sector were covered under
0
SOX, even though the Act did not explicitly allow for this. 34 The Court
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Beyond the funding issues, our enforcement program faces other difficulties
and inconsistencies between programs:
* Filing deadlines vary among statutes from 30 to 180 days.
* Seven

OSHA-enforced

statutes

permit

preliminary

reinstatement

of a

complainant; only eight authorize punitive damages.
* A different eight statutes give complainants the right to seek direct final
enforcement in district court.

* Most newer statutes permit a 'kick-out provision,' where complainants may
remove their cases to district court and obtain hearings if DOL has not ma[d]e
a decision within a prescribed number of days.
* Statutes also differ according to burdens of proof required to show retaliation.
Id.
337. Id.
338. See Lawson v. FMR LLC, 571 U.S. _, 134 S. Ct. 1158, 1159 (2014) (holding the SOX
whistleblower protection extends to employees of private contractors serving public companies).
339. Id. at 1158.
340. Seeid.at1176.
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reasoned that increasing whistleblower protections beyond the plain
wording of the statute was not only in conformance with the purpose of
the statute, but a necessary precaution in ensuring proper safeguards
were put in place to prevent another incident similar to what had
happened with Enron. 3 4 1 By doing this, the Court in Lawson was
essentially expressing their willingness to extend whistleblower
protections to different classes of private employees for the sake of
protecting the public against the threat of future financial disasters.
Additionally, in late 2014, the SEC awarded an informant $30
million for providing information that led to a successful enforcement
action.as a part of their whistleblower bounty program.342 The bounty
program provides that the SEC may award a whistleblower monetary
compensation for coming forward with "high-quality original
information that leads to a Commission enforcement action in which
over $1 million in sanctions is ordered." 34 3 The monetary award
generally ranges from ten percent to thirty percent of the total amount
collected from a successful SEC action against an employer. 34 The
undisclosed whistleblower provided the SEC with valuable information
concerning ongoing fraud that would have been difficult for the SEC to
detect. 345 This award represents the largest payout the SEC has given to
a whistleblower by more than double since the inception of the bounty
program in 2011.346 The director of the enforcement division of the SEC
even commented on the depth of this award stating, "[t]his recordbreaking award sends a strong message about our commitment to
whistleblowers and the value they bring to law enforcement." 3 47
This recent expansion of employees' rights and protections
evidences the readiness of both the courts and administrative agencies to
accept legislation aimed at protecting and incentivizing employees in the
private sector who blow the whistle on their employers. A 2015 study of
whistleblower patterns showed that OSHA is considering other options

341. See id. at 1169-70.
342. Tom Huddleston, Jr., SEC hands out $30 million in largest-ever whistleblower award,
FORTUNE (Sept. 22, 2014, 2:40 PM), http://fortune.com/2014/09/22/sec-hands-out-30-million-inlargest-ever-whistleblower-award/; Steven Pearlman, Top 10 Whistleblowing And Retaliation
Events of2014, LAw360 (Jan. 6, 2015, 10:43 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/603259/top-10whistleblowing-and-retaliation-events-of-2014.
343.

Welcome to the Office of the Whistleblower, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/whistleblower

(last visited Dec. 20, 2016).
344. Id.
345. See Huddleston, Jr., supranote 342.
346. See id.
347. Id.
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and "exploring additional ways to increase damage awards" when it
comes to motivating private sector employees to blow the whistle. 348
The federal government has also become more aware of the value of
whistleblowers and as a result has taken more aggressive efforts in terms
of pursuing claims and encouraging whistleblowers to provide
information. 34 9 It is clear from the push to provide additional protections
and the recent reaction to instances involving whistleblowers by both the
Executive and Judicial branches that the United States is ready and
willing for the Legislature to take action to calm this continuing conflict
for workplace whistleblowers.
V. RESOLUTION BASED
FRAmEWORK

ON

FCA AND STATE LEGISLATIVE

A. Success of the FCA in IncentivizingEmployees
The FCA has been relatively successful in exposing corruption and
illegal acts of employers in the public sector by creating an incentive
system. 350 In 2014, the Department of Justice recovered $5.69 billion as
a result of whistleblower participation and "qui tam actions" 351 against
private companies doing business in the public sector.352 In most cases,
employees were able to bring claims against their employers under the
FCA because the companies had defrauded the government in some
way, usually by attempting to make an end run around agency approval
in some way or by causing healthcare systems such as Medicare and
Medicaid to be economically defrauded.353 The incentive system in the
FCA for bringing these claims works to award employees a percentage
of the fine imposed upon a company relative to the amount of
involvement of the employee in the investigatory and resolution efforts
of the case.354 The purpose of the incentive system in the FCA is to
motivate employees to speak out against their employers when they
uncover corrupt or illegal acts, while counteracting the fear for their
348.

Friedman, supranote 89.

349. See Pearlman,supra note 342.
350.

See Guttman, supra note 86.

351. A "qui tam action" is defined as an "action brought under a statute that allows a private
person to sue for a penalty, part of which the government or some specified public institution will
receive." Qui Tam, BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
352. See Guttman, supra note 86; see also Getnick, supra note 119 (claiming an average of

$3.7 billion in annual recoveries as a result of successful FCA claims).
353.

See Guttman, supranote 86.

354. See Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 88, at 281-84.
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financial future, which comes from potentially being blackballed from
their industry, and all the other pressures associated with reporting a
malfeasant employer.35 5

Just as the FCA provides motivation for employees of private
companies doing business in the public sector, the same can and should
be done for all employees in the private sector by grafting this
historically successful system onto new legislation aimed at private
sector employees. There are two viable options to achieve this: (1)
expand the current Act to extend to all private sector employees, or (2)
enact a stand-alone piece of uniform federal legislation separate from
both the FCA and the current assortment of statutes and common law
doctrine. The first option would only require an amendment be made to
the current law to include a new category of employees. To achieve this
end, an amendment would theoretically extend FCA coverage beyond
protecting employees of private companies having some involvement in
the public sector to all employees of all private companies regardless of
involvement in the public sector. The second option, however, would
require Congress to create an entirely new law aimed at whistleblower
protections. Although this presents more of a legislative obstacle than
the first option, option two will give lawmakers the ability to design a
wholly inclusive law from the ground up protecting all whistleblowers
and, for the first time, will provide them the opportunity to address and
remedy the past failures of attempted federal whistleblower legislation.
Much like the attempts of the Private Sector Whistleblower Protection
Streamlining Act of 2007,356 and subsequent reintroduction of the
Private Sector Whistleblower Protection Streamlining Act of 2012 3 a
new law would be able to give potential whistleblowers a centralized
agency to report claims to, along with a uniform process for the filing of
claims.
Applying either method will provide a streamlined system by which
employees can file complaints and communicate information about
wrongdoing with greater ease of accessibility, while also creating a
windfall system relative to. the their efforts. A system that makes
reporting processes easier and rewards employees for doing the right
thing will facilitate an environment where a much-needed increase in
whistleblower participation will be inevitable.

355. See id. at 285-86; Depoorter & De Mot, supranote 9.
356. Private Sector Whistleblower Protection Streamlining Act of 2007, H.R. 4047, 110th
Cong. (2007).
357. Id.
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B. Successful State Legislative Frameworkas a Model
In amending the current legislation or creating an entirely new law,
it is instructive to look at the past successes and failures of similar laws
to develop a practical framework with staying power. After looking at
the aforementioned analysis .of various states' laws and federal
legislation in regards to whistleblower's protections, it is easy to
determine that applying New Jersey's CEPA,358 in conjunction with the
FCA, would be the most conducive to creating a more uniform federal
act. 35 9 It is clear that the FCA's incentive system should be adopted in
this proposed uniform federal act, as it has a history of motivating
employees to blow the whistle for a payout; however, one may ask why
is the CEPA an important provision in this framework? 360 The CEPA
has been widely successful in New Jersey, by allowing both private
employees protections they have never been afforded, and by protecting
361thNe
In.fact, the New
the public from potentially dangerous situations.
Jersey CEPA has been described as "the most far reaching
'whistleblower statute' in the nation," as it is one of the only
whistleblowing statutes that extends protections to private employees.362
According to statistical data gathered through Verdict Search, an
employee bringing a suit in violation of the CEPA, was sought to prevail
at trial more than eighty percent of the time.363 Out of thirty total
verdicts in New Jersey between January 2005 and December 2011,
twenty-five of these cases ruled in the plaintiff s favor.3 * Moreover, the
average damages award being granted to injured employees is upward of
about $1.1 million.365
There have also been a variety of cases that demonstrate the
effectiveness of this Act and show that the CEPA has really broadened
the rights of employees in the private sector. 36 6 For example, in 2003, an
358. See New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:19-134:19-8 (West 2011); see also New Jersey Whistleblowers Prevailat Trial Over 80% of the Time,
McMORAN,

O'CONNOR,

&

BRAMLEY,

P.C.,

http://www.mcmoranlaw.com/new-jersey-

whistleblowers-prevail-trial-over-80-time (last visited Dec. 21, 2016).
359. See supra Part I.B.; supra Part IIB.
360.

See supra Part V.A.

361.

See supra Part II.B.

362.

McMORAN, O'CONNOR, & BRAMLEY, P.C., supra note 358; see also N.J. STAT. ANN.

§§

34:19-1-34:19-8.
363.

McMORAN, O'CONNOR, & BRAMLEY, P.C., supra note 358.

364. Id.
365. Id.
366. See Donelson v. DuPont Chambers Works, 20 A.3d 384, 393 (N.J. 2011); see also
Hennessey v. Atl. County Dep't of Pub. Safety, No. 06-CV-143, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84936 at
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employee of.DuPont Changers Works filed multiple complaints with
OSHA as well as DuPont's management alleging unsafe working
conditions on the job site.367 These working conditions, such as searches
in pitch darkness near oncoming traffic or mismanagement in the
phosgene reactor, were both harmful to the employees of DuPont as well
as the public.368 Plaintiff Seddon alleged in his complaint that his
employer retaliated against him for making such complaints about the
intolerable working conditions. 3 69 As a result, the New Jersey Supreme
Court awarded the Plaintiff over $1.2 million.o Other cases in New
Jersey closely mirrored this result. 3 7 1 In Hennessey v. Atl. County Dep 't
of Pub. Safety, 372 the Plaintiff walked away with almost $1.5 million in
damages after successfully blowing the whistle on corrupt practices
within the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office.3 73
It is also essential to examine how some states have failed at
protecting whistleblowers in the private sector, and how these statutes
should act as a guidance for how not to draft a successful whistleblower
law. As mentioned previously in this article, Texas has absolutely no
regulation in place that will protect a private sector employee who blows
the whistle on someone within the company and is later retaliated
374
Essentially, Texas' lack of legislation will provide no
against.
guidance when creating a more uniform federal law as proposed in the
text. 3 75 However, states such as New York and California do contain
some kind of direction in regards to whistleblowing, yet have proved to
be failures in the private industry.3 76 For example, New York's statute
on its face explains that an employee will be given their day in court if
they are ever retaliated against for disclosing wrongful conduct within
their workforce.377 Although seemingly protective in nature, this statute

*1 (D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2008).
367. Donelson, 20 A.3d at 387.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 387-88.
370. Id. at 389.
371. See, e.g., Hennessey, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84936 at *1.
372. See id.
373.

See Steve Strunsky, Metro Briefing

/

New Jersey: Hackensack: Whistleblower Suit

Settled, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/08/nyregion/metro-briefingnew-jersey-hackensack-whistleblower-suit-settled.html?_r-2.
374. See supra Part H.B.
375.

See Texas Whistleblower Laws, FINDLAW, http://statelaws.findlaw.com/texas-law/texas-

whistleblower-laws.html (last visited Dec. 24, 2016).
376. See N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740 (McKinney 2015); see also CAL. LAB. CODE
2011).
377. See N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740 (McKinney 2015).
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has been struck down throughout New York courts due to random
circumstances invalidating the various employees' claims, such as a lack
of substantial danger to the public.37 8 The discrepancy that lies in this
regulation, making the chances of prevailing very unlikely, is that it is
too favoring towards the employer.379 New York has yet to realize that
an employee is the underdog in whistleblowing situations, facing
immense amounts of scrutiny from employers just because they are
attempting to cure misconduct.3 8 0 When drafting a new federal uniform
law, the failure of New York's labor law to actually afford employees
1
protections should be taken into consideration. 38 The California law
regarding whistleblowers could also be looked at as completely
82
unsuccessful in actually providing protections.3 Although in short it is
stated that the law was created to "encourage workplace whistleblowers
to report unlawful acts without fearing retaliation," it is clear that it is
not as simple as it appears to be.3 83 An employee must satisfy an
estimated four requirements to get their case heard, and then must be
cautious to not violate one of the many exceptions underlying the statute,
such as the "first report rule."384 It is essential that a uniform law
proposal examines the faults contained in the California statute and
attempts to remedy them by being very specific as to how an employee
385
can prevail when bringing a whistleblowing claim.

Also, a new

federal law must be aware of the concealed exceptions lying within the
California regulation and be cautious to avoid making the same errors in
the draffing process.3 86
By mirroring the FCA's incentive system for public employees and
coupling it with the protections afforded by successful state legislative
378.
379.

See Bompane v. Enzolabs, Inc., 608 N.Y.S.2d 989, 991 (N.Y. 1994).
See, e.g., id. (displaying a case where an employer prevailed because the New York Labor

Law was not drafted in the best interest of the employee's protections).

380. See id. at 989; see also Bordell v. Gen. Elec. Co., 922 F.2d 1057, 1060-61 (2d Cir. 1991).
These two cases both ruled in the employer's favor because both employees failed to satisfy all
necessary requirements that are outlined in the statute. Bompane, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 994-95; Bordell,
922 F.2d at 1061. As a result, both employers were fired from their employment due to their
whistleblowing. Bompane, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 995.
381. See, e.g., Bordell, 922 F.2d at 1057 (displaying a failure that should be taken into
consideration).
382. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5 (West 2011).
383. Id.
384. See Hager v. County of Los Angeles, 228 Cal. App. 4th 1538, 1549-51, as modified (Aug.
19, 2014), reh'g denied (Sept. 18, 2014), review denied (Nov. 25, 2014) (demonstrating the "first
report rule" exception in action).

385. See, e.g., id. (showing the faults in the California Labor Code where employers are
favored over employees).
386. See id.
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acts for private employees, while avoiding the errors made in failed state
laws, a more uniform federal act can be created to protect the rights of
whistleblowers in the private sector.
C. Conclusion
Creating a system where employees have a more free flow system
to disseminate information about corrupt or illegal practices of
employers, while also ensuring protection against retaliation and being
blackballed from a particular industry, will create an environment where
employees from all industries feel more comfortable. Coupling this with
an incentive system to provide altruistic employees with a windfall will
hopefully provide employees with the motivation they need to blow the
whistle and ultimately prevent harmful acts of corporate giants from
reaching the public. In addition to all of the socioeconomic and legal
reasons in support of whistleblower reform, it is entertaining to consider
that giving these workplace whistleblowers more rights and protections
may even make it so that the names of these people become household
names, like America's famous whistleblowers.
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